Journal of Administration Overseas

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INCLUDING

Problems of City Government
by G. W. Jones

The Politics of Municipal Administration in Iran
by Ann Schulz

The Gezira Scheme Extensions — A Case Study
by Taha el Jack Taha

The Social Development of Nigerian Agriculture
by Segun Famoriyo

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Editor's Notes

How best to manage the affairs of great cities is one of the major world-wide problems created by the unprecedented pace of urban growth during the past quarter century. Now, as the United Nations prepares for HABITAT '76*, it seems a timely occasion to include Dr. Jones' article on city government, in which, in clear and forthright style, he sets out the difficulties facing urban authorities and instances the particular situation in Britain since the recent structural reforms to show the options which were open to the reformers and the problem they faced of reconciling functional efficiency with popular accountability. This Journal has often been a forum for the argument between generalists and specialists in public administration. It is some while since the former have had so strong and convincing an advocate as Dr. Jones who wants to see the last word in decision-taking lie with the democrat-councillor not the "econocrat" official. In our second article on urban affairs, Dr. Schulz examines another and important urban problem – the development of urban local government on a popular basis in a country, Iran, with a tradition for strongly centralised control of all the affairs of State.

Taha el Jack Taha follows up his earlier article on tenancy farming on the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan** with a study of recent and successful extensions which have been taking place but which are in some jeopardy from vital rural workers being attracted to better paid urban jobs. A different rural problem is examined by Dr. Famoriyo who sees Nigerian customary land tenure as being in need of reform if agricultural output is to be optimised. Historically he believes that the relevant customary law was of great benefit to the people but that modern agricultural methods now call for a new, nationally-guided approach to land tenure.

Finally Dr. Bhattacharya outlines the administrative infrastructure for dealing with drought-relief in Maharashtra State.

*The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, Vancouver, Canada, May/June 1976.

**Vol. XII, No. 4, October 1973.

Problems of City Government

By G. W. JONES

Dr. Jones is Reader in Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science.

THE problems facing public authorities in the cities seem increasingly formidable. Expanding populations demand more services, and the rising expectations of citizens reinforce these demands. Yet resources are scarce so that demands are not fully met. The consequent disappointments help breed frustration which may turn to apathy, alienation from the government system or even outright hostility.

In their quest for functional efficiency public authorities seek to increase the size of their areas so that they can command more resources and thus afford to pay more skilled staff, provide more specialised facilities, buildings and equipment, and with their enlarged catchment areas provide more services to minority groups whom it would not be economically feasible for a small public agency to assist. Yet as public authorities become bigger, they become more remote from the people they serve and less responsive to the needs of different groups and localities within the cities. The reconciliation of the needs of functional efficiency, which tends to largeness, and of popular accountability, which tends to smallness, is one of the most difficult tasks facing city government today.

Cities, which are economic and social units, are fragmented administratively and politically. There is little correspondence between the city as an economic and social community and the city as an administrative and political community. Furthermore, a number of public agencies operate in the city:

i. *the national government* may be responsible for a variety of services and functions which it provides either directly from departments at the national capital or indirectly through its regional outposts;
ii. a large number of *local self-governing authorities* may be providing services often competing with and duplicating each other's efforts;
iii. there may be a number of *ad hoc* boards or agencies, set up to perform a particular function, who operate quite distinct from local government or central departments. Such agencies are composed in a variety of ways – by ministerial appointment, by interest-group nomination, by indirect election from local authorities or by a combination of all three; and
iv. there may be a tangle of *joint committees and boards, working parties and meetings of representatives of the public agencies*, all seeking to co-ordinate their activities and increase their efficiency.

Public power in the city is thus fragmented. The result is that the citizen finds government incomprehensible; he does not understand which agency

is responsible for which function and does not know whom to hold accountable for governing his city. There is no one public person or institution with the duty of looking at the city as a whole, so as to assess its needs and weigh up the demands of its inhabitants. There is no one public authority with the duty to assess the resources of the city, and then to relate these resources to the needs of the city and to devise an order of priorities and a combination of public services that is most appropriate. The city, despite being ruled by a multitude of authorities, lacks a complete city government.

Decisions about the deployment of the city's resources are dispersed among a variety of agencies. A large number of public institutions take crucial decisions about the use of finance, of land, of buildings, of equipment and of manpower in the city. The allocation of resources, which is the process of decision-making that determines the priorities and objectives of government, is scattered and haphazard.

Fragmentation is not only by agency but also by function. It is increasingly recognised that public services are interrelated. Housing, for instance, is related to the cluster of environmental services, like industrial location, land-use planning, the design of transportation networks, development, redevelopment and conservation, water and sewerage, as well as to the social services like education, child care, welfare and health. The places where people live, work, shop and enjoy themselves need to be planned together with the roads, public transport and the traffic management system. The physical environment interacts with the social environment, so physical planning and social planning need to be taken together. Housing is an essential part of social policy, since the home is the basis of family life. Those people who have the most severe housing problems are those who make the greatest demands on the personal social services: the young, the old, the poor, the fatherless, the handicapped, families with a large number of children. If the objective of a city government is to pursue a coherent social programme, for instance reducing deprivation, poverty and inequalities of opportunity, then it needs to be responsible for the totality of public services in the city. At the moment, such an integrated approach to city problems and resources is impossible because public services are divided among so many separate agencies.

The problems outlined so far have not been ascribed to any particular city. They seem to be common to most big cities in the world[1], and to confront both developed and developing nations alike. Although one should be cautious about transplanting institutions and processes from one society, culture and government system to another, it may be helpful to consider how in Great Britain the city problems of England are being tackled, and the debates and arguments that have been produced. The issues that have been raised in England have a relevance for developing countries too. The rest of this article will examine first the recent major reorganisation of English local government, the first since the end of the nineteenth century, and in particular its consequences for the cities. Secondly it will examine changes

[1]See *Great Cities of the World*, Eds. W. A. Robson and D. E. Regan; Allen & Unwin, London, 1972.

in the internal organisation of local authorities, at the levels of both the elected members and the full-time bureaucrats, looking in particular at the move toward corporate management and community planning. Thirdly it will examine the leadership of local government, looking in particular at the roles, the education and training of leaders. The objective is not only to inform about recent developments in England but also to examine the issues these developments raised and to stimulate discussion on some controversial items. It makes no claim to present a solution.

Reorganisation of the Structure of Local Government

In April 1974 a new structure of local government in England[2] replaced the one which had lasted since the end of the nineteenth century. The results are fewer and larger local authorities, excluding London's 34 authorities, 1210 local authorities are reduced to 377. The new system covers the country with a two-tier structure of counties and districts, thus subjecting the cities, which up to now have enjoyed the single-tier county borough form of all-purpose government, to a hierarchy of tiers that fragment local-governmental authority.[3]

The Government's decision to adopt the two-tier structure was a repudiation of the recommendation of Lord Redcliffe-Maud's Royal Commission[4] on Local Government in England which between 1966 and 1969 had conducted a searching inquiry. The Commission criticised the division of functions among tiers[5], and praised the all-purpose county borough as "local government in its simplest, most understandable and potentially most efficient form"[6]. Accordingly the Commission recommended that over most of England there should be fifty eight "unitary" authorities, of between 250,000 and one million in population. The arguments in favour of such a system were that it would be both democratic and efficient, because

a. the unitary authorities would be comprehensible and likely to interest and involve the public;
b. services which impinged on one another would be planned and operated by a single authority; and
c. the elected representatives of the community would be able to control the totality of local government functions. This power to control the development of the community would make the choices of voters at local elections really meaningful, since they would be choosing representatives with the authority to determine the future of their area.

The Commission, however, destroyed the force of the argument by advocating a two-tier structure for the three conurbations of the West Midlands, Merseyside and Greater Manchester. It concluded that a unitary

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[1]Excluding London which had been reorganised in 1965.
[2]This article deals only with the situation in England. Similar local government reform has been introduced for Scotland and Wales.
[4]Royal Commission on Local Government in England (*Command* 4040), H.M.S.O., London, 1969 (the Redcliffe-Maud Report).
[5]*Ibid.* Vol. 2 of the Report contains D. Senior's memoranda of dissent in which he advocated the two-tier system.
[6]*Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 68.

authority of over a million in population would present organisational and managerial problems and be too massive for a viable system of local democracy. Critics of the unitary system argued that if a two-tier system could be justified in these cases, it could in others too, even outside conurbations. Opponents of the unitary system deployed a number of arguments: (i) they complained that the unitary authorities would be too huge, bureaucratic and remote from the citizen who would lose intimate contact with a local authority close to him; (ii) the consequent reduction in the number of councils would reduce the number of elected members, and thus many people who had served on the councils of local authorities would be denied the opportunity to be councillors in the future. Therefore, there would be a weakening of local democracy; (iii) the reduction in the number of authorities would also reduce the need for many full-time officials, especially those at the head of departments. They would suffer a loss of status, if in the future they had to be subordinate to new heads of departments, or even unemployment; (iv) the disruption caused by such a major upheaval might be too great to maintain efficient services; (v) the unitary system looked in many cases as if it would secure the domination of cities over rural areas. The interests of the countryside, rural areas, villages and small towns, looked like being subordinated to urban interests; (vi) the unitary authorities in some areas did not correspond to the sociogeographical facts of life. The authorities would be artificial since the settlement-pattern of population distribution did not fall simply into a number of self-contained units; (vii) the size and shape of the unitary authorities did not meet the requirements of all local government services, some of which, like the social services, need much smaller authorities, and some, like land planning, require much bigger authorities.

As a result of the Local Government Act of 1972 there are six metropolitan counties in England ranging in population from nearly 1.2 million to over 2.78 million, beneath which come 36 metropolitan districts with populations which range from 178,000 to over one million. It is a system similar to that for London where there is a Greater London Council for just over seven million people, and 32 London Boroughs most of which have a population of some 250,000. In the rest of England there are 39 counties with populations around 400,000 and 296 districts whose average population is around 90,000.

The two-tier system is not uniform over the whole country. There are major differences in the distribution of functions between the metropolitan and the non-metropolitan areas of England. In the six English metropolitan areas[7] the functions are allocated in a quite different way from that followed in the rest of the country. In brief, in these metropolitan areas, the lower tier, the district, has the most functions, whereas in the non-metropolitan areas the top tier, the county, has the most. For example, counties in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have land use and transport planning, police and fire services, and in the non-metropolitan areas they have education, libraries and the social services as well, but in the metropolitan

[7]The Metropolitan areas are West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, and Tyne and Wear.

areas the last three functions are the responsibility of the districts. Outside the metropolitan areas the districts have relatively few functions; housing, local planning, local transport and environmental health services.

In the cities, therefore, which had been governed by the single-tier county borough system, local government functions that are intimately linked together are now divided between two authorities. A once simple system was made complex, and the complexity rendered all the more complicated by failure to allocate functions on a clear-cut basis. For instance, in land-use planning the county draws up the structure plan, which outlines broad uses of land, while the districts devise local plans in more detail and operate development control, all within the framework of the structure plan. Further, the districts collect refuse, but the counties dispose of it. Thus some functions have been split between the tiers. There is still more confusion from the provisions for shared and concurrent powers in respect of parks and open spaces and aerodromes, and the device of "agency" whereby one authority may arrange for another to carry out some of its functions. Thus people in the cities will find it more difficult than in the past to know who is responsible for which service.

Such a complex distribution of functions enhances the likelihood of friction between authorities in the future, since each authority, directly elected and with its own full-time bureaucracy, will develop its own concept of what is in the best interests of its own area. Conflict seems inevitable, despite the establishment of a network of joint committees and working parties to try to co-ordinate the activities of the various tiers. And the conflict will be embittered when, as often happens, the county is controlled by one political party and the district by its rival.

In England, fragmentation of services is not only by tier but also by function. Services which had once been the responsibility of the city government have recently been removed from local government and handed to appointed and nominated agencies. Water, sewage disposal and some sewerage functions have been allocated to ten regional water authorities, thus hindering the task of tackling pollution, since local government at the district level remains responsible for environmental health. But the personal health services that local government once controlled, such as midwifery, child care, family planning, health centres and ambulances, have been given to 14 regional and 72 area health authorities.

To the advocate of the unitary system the new structure of English local government seems exactly an example of what should be avoided. Others, however, argue that it presents a challenge to the counties, districts and special agencies to co-operate with each other; indeed it is clear that the new system cannot operate successfully without widespread co-operation. The elected members and local civil servants of the future are going to have to spend much time and energy negotiating and bargaining across administrative boundaries, and they will have to acquire new skills of diplomacy.

People anxious to encourage local democracy have argued that in the metropolitan areas the lower tier, the metropolitan district, is too large, remote from the citizen and does not correspond to any meaningful com-

munity. Surveys of the attitudes of city inhabitants suggest that they feel attached to quite small areas, usually the neighbourhood where they live. There is a growing movement for the creation of neighbourhood councils, or urban parish councils, certainly to represent the views of local inhabitants and perhaps to provide some services that the residents desire. Genuine communities, it is argued, should find expression in local councils. But a major problem is how to define a community.

From the foregoing description of recent developments in England and the arguments they have provoked, one can see that there are a number of models for the structure of urban local government, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The models, based on the distribution of functions, are:

a. *a unitary system*, which was recommended by the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission and, in the form of the county borough, was the traditional way of organising local government in cities in Great Britain;

b. *a two-tier system in which most functions are at the level of the bottom tier*, which is the system now in operation in London and in the six English metropolitan areas;

c. *a two-tier system in which most functions are at the level of the top tier*, which is the system now in operation in the English non-metropolitan areas.

If one wants to include a tier to represent small neighbourhoods or communities, then the above three models can be modified:

d. beneath the unitary authority can be established a number of community councils, not to provide services, but to advise the top level and represent the views of inhabitants;

e. beneath the bottom tier of (b), one might also establish similar advisory and representative councils;

f. as one could beneath the bottom tier of (c), although here one might also

g. have the second tier itself as representative of small communities as well as providing a few minor services, and thus avoid a third tier.

The composition of the local authorities also presents choices. The British solution is for direct election to each tier. But another method is indirect election. In this system one tier could be directly elected, and it could then select from its members or even from outsiders members, of the other tier or tiers, which might have the advantage through interlocking memberships of facilitating co-ordination between different local authorities.

The Internal Organisation of City Government

It is somewhat ironical that in English cities local government services have been fragmented at the very time when PPBS (Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems), corporate management and community planning have been becoming increasingly fashionable, and these approaches to decision-making seem to be most suited for a unitary system. A recent examination

of the internal structure of English local authorities[8] stated that: "Local government is not, in our view, limited to the narrow provision of a series of services to the local community . . . It has within its purview the overall economic, cultural and physical well-being of that community . . ." (p. 6). The tiered structure raises obstacles to the achievement of an overall view. However, within the present allocation of functions to local government the Bains report contains some interesting proposals about the ways in which both the elected members and the local civil servants should organise themselves.

Traditionally a local authority in Britain has possessed a very fragmented internal structure. The elected members have been divided into committees for specific services like housing, libraries, education and street cleaning, or for processes like staffing and finance. The local government officials have been divided into departments based on a professional specialism and headed by a professional, like an engineer, an architect, a doctor, or an accountant. There was no formal provision other than the Council for co-ordinating either the work of committees or the work of the departments, but in most cities various conventional devices had emerged by the 1960s. Elected members were sometimes co-ordinated by a General Purpose Committee or by the Party Group to which they belonged, and the civil servants were co-ordinated by meetings of the leading officials under the chairmanship of the Clerk, who was often regarded as the chief administrative officer. Invariably he was a lawyer.

This traditional structure made it difficult to plan the work of the local authority as a whole and to allocate resources amongst the various services in a rational way. The advocates of PPBS and corporate management argued that a new structure was needed to carry out new processes of decision-making on resource-allocation. They wanted to relate financial, budgeting and resource allocation procedures to the classic planning cycle: the setting of objectives; the generation of alternatives; the evaluation of each alternative strategy in terms of the resources required (input) and the contribution of each towards the fulfilment of the objectives (output); the choice of strategy and its implementation; the monitoring of achievement and the subsequent review of objectives and strategy. The structure of committees as recommended by the Bains Report was designed to facilitate such a process. At the top would be a Policy and Resources Committee, to identify the needs of the area, to set objectives and establish priorities, to allocate resources, to draw up the plan for the use of land in the area, and to control and co-ordinate the implementation of the council's plans. This central committee would have four sub-committees: three corresponding to the main resources—finance, manpower and land, and one, the performance review sub-committee, to conduct efficiency audits and to monitor performance. There would also be about six Programme Committees, responsible for broad areas of objectives or functional fields, eg. education, social services, development services, recreation and amenities, environmental health and control, and housing

[8] *The New Local Authorities: management and structure* (the Bains Report) – London, H.M.S.O., 1972.

services. The Report devised an ingenious means to link as many councillors as possible to the Policy and Resources Committee. It recommended that membership of its sub-committees should not be restricted to those on the parent committee, mainly the chairmen of the Programme Committees; other members of the Programme Committees should serve on the sub-committees of the Policy and Resources Committee and thus keep it in touch with the views of their own Programme Committees, while they would be able to contribute to the Programme Committees the views and perspective of the Policy and Resource Committee. Therefore, the consideration of policies, programmes and resources would be knit together in an intricate network of interlocking memberships.

The members of the Policy and Resources Committee would consist of the leading members of the Council, the chairmen of the Programme Committees, and they would be likely to be the leading figures of the majority party on the council. The Bains Report recommended that members of the Policy and Resources Committee should not be drawn from just the majority party. By admitting a few opposition members, it is claimed, there would be less mistrust in the council, the opposition's views would be heard and considered, and reversals of policy following a change of party control might be avoided. However, others argue that since the Policy and Resources Committee should, if it is to be effective, reflect the power structure of the majority party, all the members should come from the one party. In this way the electorate can see clearly what group is responsible. There is no blurring of accountability. Opposition members could, of course, serve on the sub-committees of the Policy and Resources Committee, but not on the main committee itself.

The civil servants of the council would remain organised in their departments, but the most important of them would form a management team chaired by a Chief Executive who would be the acknowledged leader of the administration. As head of the authority's paid service he would be responsible for the provision of co-ordinated advice to the council and for the implementation of agreed policies and plans. The management team would be the focal point for the preparation and presentation to the council, *via* the Policy and Resources Committee and the Programme Committees, of advice on policy and major programmes of work. Through working on the management team the individual chief officials would be brought to consider the wider objectives of the authority and not just those of their own departments.

A point of controversy in Britain is whether the Chief Executive should have a department of his own. Those who are opposed say that if he were to have a department he would act as a defender of his department and would not take a broad view of his council as a whole; he would be regarded as a rival by other departmental heads, thus frustrating a corporate approach; and he would be distracted by departmental duties from his tasks of planning and co-ordination. Others, however, feel that he needs a department as a power-base and as a means of acquiring information about what is going on in the departments and committees. Without a department he may become

aloof and impotent, brooding on policy from afar while the departments proceed unchecked.

Beyond the Local Authority

The elected members, organised into their Policy and Resources Committee, and the civil servants, organised into their management team, would be primarily engaged in producing and monitoring corporate plans for their own local authority. But there are other local authorities and public agencies at work in the city, whose activities impinge on urban development. If each agency contrives to think only in terms of its own service or set of services, then the needs of the city as a whole will suffer. For community planning to take place over the whole metropolitan area when there are a number of tiers of local government, the top-tier local authority must acquire a new responsibility. It must decide to play the leading role in devising a plan for all public services in the city, whatever the type of agency which provides them and in persuading these other agencies to conform with the plan. Of course, during the plan-making and objective-setting stages the top-tier authority should consult widely with all other public agencies in the city. This strategic function is a new one for British local government, but it is surely an essential one where the city is divided into a number of public agencies. The separate agencies and the local authorities at the lower tier may resent what they will regard as interference by the upper tier with their responsibilities. But the upper tier has a powerful claim for its leading role, especially if it is directly elected by the citizens and thus has a legitimacy not possessed by the appointed or nominated boards; and with its responsibility for the whole city it covers a far wider area than any one authority beneath. If a city cannot be governed by an unitary system, then the upper-tier should assume the responsibility of the leading role of community planner for the city.

The co-ordinarion of the functions of the various public agencies in the city is not something that should happen only at the top. Just as within the local authority there should be flexible and loosely structured working parties of members of different committees and departments contributing to the solution of problems which affect numerous committees and departments, so within the city as a whole there should be a system of flexible teams providing opportunities for collaboration between the members of the various public agencies in the city. Corporate planning is not just a process that takes place at the peaks, it should penetrate into the depths. It is not a process only for the leading members; it should engage the participation of all.

Elected Members and Officials

A recent report on *Conduct in Local Government*[9] sums up admirably a distinction that many people outside Britain find very strange. "British local government, unlike that in some other countries, embodies a fundamental distinction between two types of public servant: the elected member and the

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[9]Prime Minister's Committee on Local Government Rules of Conduct: Command 5636; H.M.S.O., London, 1974.

appointed employee. The councillor is responsible to the electorate and serves only so long as his term of office lasts; the employee is responsible to the authority and the period of his employment is not determined by the electorate. The councillor usually owes allegiance to a political party; the employee's allegiance is to the authority as a whole. Councillors settle the authority's policies; employees contribute to their formulation and, once decided, implement them. Thus the roles of councillor and employee are separate but complementary." This system is thought by many in Britain to produce both political responsibility and professional specialisation. The officials are allowed to develop a high degree of professional expertise, which comes from their security of employment and an hierarchical career pattern. Yet they are subordinate to the political direction and control of councillors who are responsible to the electorate.

Although there is in Britain a clear distinction between the careers of councillors and officials, there is no such clear distinction between their functions. It has sometimes been asserted that policy is a matter exclusively for elected members and administration for officers, but that view is increasingly regarded as unrealistic. It is surely impossible to divide the total management process of governing a city into two separate halves, one for members and the other for officers. Councillors are very interested in the administration of policy, since it often has a direct impact on the citizen and can often cause his constituents more worry than a matter of broad policy. Officers have expertise and experience to contribute to the formulation of policy. The management process can best be seen as a scale or continuum, with the setting of objectives and the allocation of major resources at one end, moving through the designing of programmes and plans, to the execution of those plans at the other end. As one moves through that management scale, the balance between the two elements changes from member control with officer advice at the "policy" end to officer control with member advice at the "execution" end. This view of the changing relationship between members and officers recognises that the member is involved at one stage, even in execution, and that the official plays an important role in assisting the member to decide on policy.

Councillors cannot all be cast in the same mould. They display a wide diversity of aims and interests. Councillors in Britain can be divided into three broad categories according to the kind of roles they play:

(i) the representative: the spokesman and watchdog;
(ii) the specialised policy-maker: concerned with one or two services or functions;
(iii) the broad policy-maker: concerned with the overall policy of the local authority.

The representative function can itself be divided into five elements:

(a) representative of a geographical area: the champion of a particular territory;
(b) representative of a broad section of the population to which he feels an attachment: factory workers, property owners, council house tenants;

(c) representative of particular organised groups to which he may be attached: political, economic, social, professional, cultural, welfare, charitable, or religious;

(d) representative of another local authority in a system of tiers;

(e) representative of individual citizens: the defender of the individual who has a complaint.

All councillors perform the representative function, some to a greater extent than others and with varying emphases. The specialised policy-maker in addition to performing the representative function, has another concern. Often he joins the council with an interest in one or two services whose development he wishes to advance, or once on the council he acquires an interest in one or two functions. The broad policy-maker has a wider span of concern than the specialised policy-maker. He is interested in the overall policy and the setting of priorities across the whole range of his authority's activities. This category provides overall leadership.

The problem is that about 75 per cent of councillors are primarily representatives, about 20 per cent are specialised policy-makers and only about 5 per cent are broad policy-makers. Yet if city problems are to be tackled with vision and dynamism, the group of broad policy-makers needs to be greatly increased. In Britain we have been moving away from the concept of the councillor as an unpaid amateur who makes financial sacrifices with his public service. He is now paid an attendance allowance of a maximum of £10 a day. Britain has not yet introduced professional councillors, but it is possible that the solution of city problems demands such office-holders, who can devote their time to city government and develop skills of leadership and co-ordination. Only professional councillors are likely to be able to make a major impact on the development of their local authority, to be a counterbalance to the power of the full-time civil servants and to attract such publicity as will make them widely known to the people of the city. Leadership and co-ordination in the city require the attention of full-time public representatives who are not distracted by the need to pursue other occupations.

In Britain it is being increasingly argued that councillors should be paid, and provided with a number of services to make them really professional. Many authorities have greatly increased the range of assistance they offer their councillors. If, so the argument runs, city government wants to attract able and ambitious people, who can think in broad terms about their city's needs, who can master the techniques of corporate management and community planning, who can bargain and negotiate with other public agencies, then the city must be prepared to pay for them, and indeed create a new career of professional councillors. If the prizes offered are big enough the competitors will come forward.

The skills such people need are pre-eminently political: how to handle one's own party and the opposition; how to bargain and reach a compromise; how to sell policies to one's supporters, and the public; how to control, direct, and inspire the full-time administration; and how to think imaginatively about setting policy objectives and considering alternative means of achieving them. It is doubtful if anyone can be trained in such skills. They

are inborn, and developed by use. Practising them reveals them and sharpens them. One should beware of those who claim to possess some special expertise acquired by training; namely the practitioners of techniques of planning, often economists who revel in quantitative methods, equations systems jargon and computers. Such skills are essential in city government, but they should be the servants not the masters. Power should reside in the hands of "generalists" not specialists; "generalists" who take a broad view, who are close to the people and sense what they will or will not accept, who are able to synthesize the different contributions of the various specialists into workable and politically acceptable programmes, and who have diplomatic skills that enable them to be successful negotiators with all the agencies that compose city government. Such "generalists" need no special education or training, except perhaps a study of the history of their city, its people and their problems, and how they have tried to solve the problems of the past. Although the city requires specialist economists, they should not be allowed to achieve such a predominant position as to become the new rulers, the "econocrats", who fail to appreciate anything that cannot be quantified. Such narrow specialists too often fail to appreciate that people are political animals with hopes, fears, values and passions, that cannot be given an economic value. Decisions about the allocation of scarce resources should in the end be taken not by economists but by politicians. Democracy must not be replaced by technocracy!

The Politics of Municipal Administration in Iran: A Case-Study of Isfahan*

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THIS paper focuses upon the city of Isfahan, which, with a population of over 500,000, is Iran's second largest city. It is the capital of the province of Isfahan and is also an industrial centre with well over half its working population engaged in manufacturing. As both a provincial administrative centre and an industrial site, Isfahan shares many of the advantages and the problems of urban areas throughout the third world.

One of the problems which is a persistent source of conflict in Iran as elsewhere, is the issue of whether decisions affecting major cities will be made at the national or local level. In some developing countries the view is held that power to local authorities threatens the integrity of the nation itself[1]. In Iran, the centre of the controversy is often the consistency of national development plans which, it is argued, may be jeopardised by insufficient co-ordination in Tehran. Indeed, Amir Hoveyda, Prime Minister since 1965, maintains that parochialism is an ever-present threat to continual social progress.

On the other hand, the merits of decentralisation have also been discussed. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has said ". . . there is no power . . . without the participation of the people"[2]. And Iranian economists argue that decentralisation could result in more efficient implementation of development projects.

Political and economic decentralisation have also been advanced as possible solutions to Tehran's growth problems. Tehran is the focal point of both the economy and the polity. Eighteen hundred of Iran's 5000 industrial units are located in Tehran province. Its population of some three million – almost 10 per cent of the whole nation – reflects that importance.

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[1]Nigeria is a clear example of the disintegration problem, c.f. B. A. Williams and A. H. Walsh, *Urban Government for Metropolitan Lagos* (New York: Praeger, 1968). For other arguments in favour of centralisation, see Rusen Keles, *Urbanisation in Turkey* (N.Y.: The Ford Foundation, International Urbanisation Survey, m.d.), p. 30. Hugh Tinker, *The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma* (N.Y.: Praeger, 2nd ed., 1968), p. 344; and Fred G. Burke, *Local Government and Politics in Uganda* (Syrecuse University Press, 1964), p. 244.

[2]*Keyhan International*, October 26, 1968.

As a result of its rapid growth over this century, the capital has, in the eyes of planners as well as its inhabitants, reached a point of over-population in terms of housing, transportation, and sanitation facilities. Because Tehran's dominance has created economic and social problems, the Fourth Development Plan (1965-1972) proposed the establishment of regional industrial centres. Four cities – Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahwaz, and Arak – were chosen as the alternative sites.

For the municipality of Isfahan this so-called "poles" policy has disadvantages as well as benefits. The industries which have been introduced have often been located outside the municipality limits. Neither the plants themselves nor their end product are available for local tax purposes. However, the employees themselves live within the city where housing, schools and public services are available.

Before the inception of the Fourth Plan, the rate of population growth in Isfahan was already high. Between the two census years 1956 and 1966, Isfahan's population increased by seven per cent p.a. The current annual growth rate is estimated to be still higher – eight per cent annually. And, a high proportion of the population is young, as well – in 1966, fifty-five per cent of the Isfahan provincial population was under twenty-five years of age.

The population increases have inflated the cost of housing and food, which is now a major source of discontent among the city's residents. The most recent government figures show a monthly increase of over one per cent in the cost of living in Isfahan (Central Bank, 1973). Industrialisation is changing the composition of the population also, which, like the quantitative changes, has political repercussions The last census showed that 90 per cent of the city's residents had been born within Isfahan province. However, this homogeneity is disappearing. In 1972, for example, a steel mill (financed by the Soviet Union) was opened on the outskirts of Isfahan. Four thousand workers and their families were brought to the city from northwest Iran to work in the mill. The new residential area[3] which was intended for the workers was unfinished when they arrived and Isfahan was forced to accommodate them.

Such massive projects inevitably cause social dislocations. The steel mill is no exception. The capacity of civil courts has been strained by the growing number of disputes arising within the working community. At the same time, students and faculty at the rapidly-growing University of Isfahan complain to municipal officials about the lack of modern living and recreational facilities. In addition, the enforcement of relatively new national social policies, which are designed to improve the quality of urban life, places a further strain upon municipal government in Isfahan.

Unfortunately, the municipality's capacity to meet these varied demands has not increased at the same rate. Recent legislation designed to accomplish a measure of political decentralisation has been ineffective. Municipal leaders still have neither the financial resources nor the authority to deal with the problems of urban growth.

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[3]Still incomplete, this zone has now been turned over to the American advisers and their families who have been brought in to staff a new helicopter base in Isfahan.

The weakness of institutions of municipal government in Iran is partly the result of a concatenation of political and economic factors which have historically determined capital/provincial relations. Beyond these historical factors, however, is a question of contemporary political strategy. Iranian officials are determined to solve urban problems, but at the same time, the national regime is committed to the notion that political centralisation is necessary for continued stability in Iran. Against these forces, the legal authority of the municipality of Isfahan carries little weight.

The Evolution of Municipal Authority

Most of the basic constitutional law of Iran is found in the Fundamental Laws, adopted in October 1907, which, *inter alia*, called for the establishment of provincial and district councils to serve as a check on the governors in "general matters affecting the public welfare"[4]. The country's financial problems, which saddled it with a large foreign debt, were to be righted by a national parliament with budgetary authority.

A number of provincial councils were established in that period but their activities were not very successful; they were plagued in some provinces by violence and internal dissension and, in others, by public apathy. Part of the difficulty was due to the breakdown of power at the national level which accompanied the revolution.

There followed a long period in which the intent of constitutional provisions to establish independent local and provincial councils was ignored, apart from short-lived and unsuccessful attempts in 1930[5] and again in 1949[6], and once more in the early Sixties[7], to initiate local government legislation afresh. Indeed, the enabling legislation which finally created a comprehensive system of village, municipal, district and provincial councils throughout Iran was not passed until 1967-1970.

The councils created after 1967 were established at a time when the power of the national government was felt more than ever before by outlying areas. The promulgation of land reform in 1963 was described as one "point" in the Revolution of the Shah and the People. Simultaneously with the land division, accompanying national institutions were established in the provinces – the co-operative movement and the Development Corporations in particular.

Policy Co-ordination at the Municipal Level

The foundations of local autonomy in any political system depend on a number of factors; one is what form of control is exercised over the selection of local decision-makers, another is local fiscal powers, a third encompasses both these factors, but is also broader than either of them: the capacity for policy co-ordination at the local level.

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[4]Lambton, A. K. S., *Persian Political Societies:* 1906-1911, p. 48.
[5]Banani, Amin, *The Modernisation of Iran:* 1921-1941, Stanford University Press, 1961.
[6]*Vide* "For your Information", August 17, 1970.
[7]Mansfield, Peter (Ed.), *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey*, C.U.P., 1973.

This is a critical issue in Isfahan, where many different agencies are involved in policy making but none is dominant. The municipality derives its authority from legislation enacted by the national parliament, and municipal officials can take on neither new policy responsibilities nor new financial obligations unless further legal authority is obtained from Parliament. The present municipal law focuses on election procedure and on the competence of the city council which empowers its administrative officers to act on its behalf. The council's formal competency is broad. The law states that the powers of the city council include: (a) "the composition, cancellation or adjustment of municipal levies;" (b) "the provision of abundant and cheap foodstuffs;" (c) "the regulation and supervision of water supplies, electricity and public transport;" (d) "the creation and extension of streets and parks;" (e) "the election of the Mayor;" and (f) "approval of the municipal budget".

In actual practice, municipal powers have not been developed to their fullest legal extent[8], they are diffused among several agencies. The municipality itself provides only four services – (1) sanitation (street-cleaning and garbage removal, but not sewerage), (2) handling road-building contracts, (3) fire control and (4) issuing building permits.

Water, electricity and transportation are within the jurisdiction of independent commissions. The otagh-e asnaf (the organisation of the combined guilds of Isfahan) manages price controls and has its own courts for dealing with offenders. The provincial governor-general regularly reviews decisions on the location of streets and parks within the city, and occasionally the Ministry of Culture and the Arts in Tehran intervenes as well. A new city plan serves as a guideline for decisions about street location and zoning, but it was drafted in Tehran; and if alterations in it are to be made, those alterations must be approved in the capital.

Educational and health programmes within the city are the primary responsibility of the provincial directors (*modiran-e kol*) of the respective national ministries. The municipality can influence educational policy by donating land for school construction, but it can determine neither the number of schools, nor their curricula. The Plan and Budget Organisation, which is part of the Prime Minister's office, has its own development projects for the city which are executed without any formal municipality participation. The Ministry of Housing is responsible for providing low-cost housing within the city, perhaps one of the most critical services today – again, without municipal co-ordination.

Policy co-ordination among the national ministries at the local level is a major function of the *shora-ye ostan* or provincial council. This council is comprised of the provincial governor-general and the provincial directors of the ministries. The latter are immediately responsible for policy execution at the urban level.

However, in practice, channels of communication and control between Tehran and the provinces circumvent the provincial council and run directly

[8]The following description of contemporary municipal government in Isfahan is based upon the author's interviews with city officials, except when otherwise noted.

from the central ministries to their directors in the field. Both complaints and requests for special consideration are channelled to Tehran when they cannot be resolved within the regional ministry office itself. The chief reason for this appears to be that the governor, although he is the chief provincial administrator and the central figure in provincial politics, still does not wield sufficient power to overcome the ministries' independence and basic competitiveness with one another. This centralising tendency is absent only in the cases of local authorities (such as the Isfahan Transportation Company) which have no parent organisation in Tehran.

The Isfahan provincial committee of the governing party, *Iran Novin*, could potentially develop as an alternative to the provincial council. The party formally dominates the national cabinet and in Isfahan controls all the seats on the city council. Its provincial committee brings together representatives of the national ministries' local offices and council members and also maintains contact with the national party hierarchy. But, at present, the committee exists primarily to hear complaints and to organise the few provincial party activities which take place. It is not a policy-making organ. The party leadership nominates candidates for the city council, but their lists are subject to the approval of the party in Tehran.

There is also, in Isfahan, an informal group of provincial and national government administrators which meets monthly to discuss public policy. At present, what general co-ordination takes place on the provincial level is handled by this group. It has no legal authority, however, and its existence does not seem to be widely known. Its role is also a minimal one in the sense that its members would have personal contact with one another whether or not they met as a group. The planning group is characteristic of Iranian politics in that it resembles a *dowre* – an informal group of acquaintances which supplements legal organisations as arenas for influencing and being influenced.

The weight given to national considerations in local affairs can be seen in another example. The *ogaf* (Endowment Organisation) has a tremendous impact upon municipal development, but it maintains no formal links with the municipality. The *ogaf* has large land-holdings in the two most valuable commercial areas in the city, and its income from rental property alone is at least half that of the municipality's annual revenue[9]. The current director of Isfahan *ogaf*, is an influential retired Army Colonel, whose personal position has probably enabled his provincial *ogaf* office to function with a greater degree of independence than those of lesser known directors elsewhere. However, despite the potential for local control in the *ogaf*, there is no commensurate means to co-ordinate its decisions with those of the municipality.

A writer for *Keyhan International*, a newspaper which often voices the government's views, has stated the need for real local co-ordination. "If

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[9]Overall budget figures for the *ogaf* are not publicly available. The rental income was pieced together from several specific references made in discussions with *ogaf* officials.

co-ordination is to become more than just a slogan of the central government, it must be tackled by people with adequate authority at the local level"[10].

However, the scope of the Isfahan municipal council's competence is so limited that there is no immediate prospect of it performing such a comprehensive role. The danger of Isfahan repeating the experience of Tehran and growing to unmanageable proportions is one which concerns several municipal officials. Municipal authority to guide development is not growing fast enough, and officials feel trapped between Tehran, reluctant to relinquish control, and constituents who see these officials as demanding yet impotent.

The combination of too little co-ordination and the municipalities' limited powers has left a local leadership vacuum. One concrete example from Isfahan relates to public health. Violations of public health standards bring no less than three agencies into action. Ministry of Health inspectors are responsible for discovering violations and reporting them to the municipality. The municipality, in turn, must order the offenders to desist or call in the *Shahrbani* (city police who are under the Ministry of the Interior). This system often breaks down. Health officials claim that the municipality often fails to pass complaints on to the police.

Isfahan's city planning head also recognises his subordinates' sensitivity to external influences. He complains that it has been difficult to enforce the growth patterns outlined in the city plan. The plan can be used by the municipality to lend legitimacy to its decisions, but it is far from definitive. Municipal policies are often ignored, the planner argued, because "if we insist on enforcing zoning requirements, the parties subject to them will exert pressure on municipal officials and avoid the restrictions".

Decision-makers in Isfahan

The municipality's modest performance record is used to justify national intervention in the recruitment of municipal leaders as well as in policy-making. Legally, city council members are popularly elected, and they in turn choose the city's mayor. But in actual practice, the local *Iran Novin* Party's nominations determine who will receive a seat on the council, and these are made with approval at the national level, while the city council invariably selects the Mayor from names proposed by higher authority in Tehran. A formal council vote is taken only after preliminary agreement has been reached. Similarly, the mayor is removed only if there is support in Tehran for such a decision.

Mayors are typically *not* residents of the cities they serve, and their selection stresses their loyalty to the national regime and, to a lesser degree, their administrative expertise rather than community leadership.

In 1969, the Iran Municipal Association (I.M.A.), based in Tehran, began a training programme for city officials. The trainees ranged from firemen to small-city mayors. The programme is designed to create a technically competent, non-political, and nationally-oriented corps of urban admnistrators. After training, the candidates may be assigned to service in any city in Iran. As a result of this programme, the mayor's previously strong personal

[10]Issue of 22 August, 1970.

influence over his subordinates has been reduced. In addition to the two assistant mayors who had been recruited through the I.M.A., two of the local mayors in the city's five districts had come to Isfahan in that manner.

The training courses have increased the employees' technical competence, but there have been complaints that the benefits of competence are outweighed by the lack of local control. Frank Sherwood[11] cites the protests of municipal leaders that the Interior Ministry's influence in local recruitment decisions undermines their own authority.

The issue of national intervention is especially important in the case of Isfahan which is a centre of potential opposition to the present regime from political groups both of the right and the left. Isfahan is the most industrialised city outside Tehran and has in the past been the base for radical labour organisations. It is also a deeply religious city with many traditionalists who are not enamoured of the present pace of change.

Because of Isfahan's size and its political and economic significance, national intervention does not take place without regard to local political realities. For instance, major office-holders in the city will often be drawn from prominent Isfahani families.

While such officials are local elites, their formal offices link them to Tehran. All but one member of the informal planning committee, to which reference has already been made, have high appointive government posts – four in Isfahan and three in Tehran. Council President Nikpay meets with this group; his own particular link with the capital is his brother Gholam Reza, the Mayor of Tehran.

In comparison with the planning committee, city councillors come from a wide variety of occupations. Of the twenty-four individuals who served on the council during the last two sessions of 1973, thirteen represented business and industry, four were from civil service positions, three were medical doctors and two were doctors' wives. Two were landowners, one of whom was actively farming his land. At least another five of the members were secondarily land or property owners.

Thus, in terms of occupation, the least powerful groups are the most diverse. Pluralism is acceptable in the council and the party committee. There landowners and businessmen have some status and recognition, but little power. On the other hand, all of the members of the "planning committee" have administrative posts; mayors, too, are recruited from other administrative posts.

The religious community in Isfahan is not represented in any of these groups. When first set up, at the beginning of the Century the council represented chiefly the business and religious communities[12]. Today, even in a religious centre such as Isfahan, the clergy has, perforce, gone into political retirement. Religious leaders are opposed to most aspects of the Revolution of the Shah and the People, from land reform to the political emancipation of women. This opposition brings them into conflict with the regime although they are still popular with the population at large.

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[11] *Cities in Iran: notes on their problems and governance*, mimeo, University of Southern California, School of Public Administration, 1961.

[12] Lambton, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Links between Groups active in Isfahan City



The diagram setting out the patterns of linkages between groups of participants in the municipal decision-making process, illustrates two points. First, it underscores the direct involvement of national institutions in municipal affairs. Army officers, some retired, others not, occupy positions in the municipality as well as in other public municipal organisations such as the *otagh-e asnaf*, the central guild committee, and the *ogaf*. The Interior Ministry is involved in the municipality both in the planning group through the governor and in the training and selection of many municipality employees. Provincial directors of other ministries serve on both the planning group and the party provincial committee. Most service companies are under the supervision of national ministries.

The other point to note is that there are two groups of actors – one surrounding the ministries and the other, the city council. The city council is involved primarily with the Party and the local business community, secondarily with the planning group and the *asnaf* (with one council member in each) and very little with the ministries or the urban service organisations. The council is isolated from the important decision-making arena. Pluralism exists there, but it is outside the centre of decision-making. The diagram underscores the conclusion that the national "administrative" hierarchy, which is also the political focal point in municipal affairs, maintains no direct co-ordinating links with the city council – a body ostensibly created to assume political responsibility.

Fiscal Powers of the Municipality

At present, financial responsibility ultimately resides in Tehran. Revenues available for municipal services have increased tremendously over the past century, but the proportion of those revenues raised locally has decreased almost as dramatically (Table I).

TABLE I
Revenue Trends: Isfahan

	Revenue/capita $	*Revenue at disposal of municipality* ($ *million*)	*% Local revenue from local tax base*
1888* ..	2.40	.6	100
1967** ..	8.50	3.4	25
1972** ..	24.00	14.7	33

Note: *Figures include revenue for Isfahan province and the population of the City, so there is an over-estimate involved probably offset to some degree by an under-estimate on the part of tax collectors in their reports, *vide* G. M. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London, 1892), p. 480.
**These figures are explained in the paragraphs that follow.

The municipality raises money in four ways – local taxes (taxes collected from the city which are not sent to Tehran), a percentage of specific national revenues collected in Isfahan are returned to the city (fifteen per cent of the income tax, for example), loans from private banks and, lastly, monies which have come to the municipality through the governor's office as direct grants from Tehran[13]. The grants are the least reliable of these revenue sources; their size depends upon the governor's skill in influencing decision-making in Tehran and, in turn, upon his estimate of the city's needs. Similarly, the percentage share of national taxes which is returned to each city is theoretically based upon population, but in practice, decision-makers in Tehran also weigh the extent of local needs and so the municipality cannot be certain, when budgeting, how much it will actually retain from this source. Because banks have appeared to offer the surest recourse, cities have borrowed vast sums from them in recent years.

Now municipal officials are afraid of continuing to even higher levels of indebtedness. The Mayor of Shiraz, for example, threatened to resign if Tehran does not either assume responsibility for the debts or extend the municipality's powers of taxation. With a realism for which city councillors seldom receive credit, Bandar Pahlavi's council refused to pass a budget which was based on "non-existent funds", hoping to force the issue with Tehran[14].

The municipal taxation system is reminiscent of medieval plans in that it consists of a series of unrelated levies on specific items (see Table II). The largest single source of municipal tax revenue in Isfahan is the property tax or

[13]In 1967 the decision was made to allocate to each provincial governor five million rials ($70,000) which he would, in turn, disperse for specific development projects. This decision was announced as a major step toward decentralisation; its purpose was to enhance the governor's independence from Tehran. The governors were to base their allocations upon Plan Organisation priorities (*Keyhan International*, March 6, 1971). Previously, in one year, 280M Rials had come to the city through the office of Isfahan's Governor, Kianpur.
[14]*Keyhan International*, May 29, 1971.

no sazi which in 1969 was authorised, like all municipal taxes, by the Parliament (*Majles*). In name and accounting practice it is a municipal tax, but it is actually collected by the regional office of the national *no sazi* administration. Municipal administrators would like to gain control of this tax, but they have been unsuccessful thus far.

TABLE II

Major Sources of Revenue: Isfahan Municipality (1972/73)[a]

Municipal Revenue		*Nationally-Distributed Revenue*	
No Sazi	$784,315	Customs Receipts ..	$1,410,000
Theatres (sales) ..	346,030	Income Taxes ..	1,320,000
Property appreciation	337,386	Grants to Governor ..	4,000,000
Kiln operations ..	168,357	Sugar Taxes	184,642
Bus tickets	163,871		
Business permits ..	160,328	Total	6,914,642
Slaughtery operations	167,386		
		Bank Loans	$4,288,889
Total	$2,127,673		

a. These figures were provided by the municipality of Isfahan. Budgetary figures are not regularly reproduced; the municipality's co-operation with this project is, therefore, gratefully acknowledged.

One of the administrators' complaints is that the collection rate is too low. The municipal residents feel differently. Isfahan has all the symptoms of a "taxpayers' revolt" which stems largely from the suspicion that property assessments for the *no sazi* tax are related to the owner's political influence. Apparently discrepancies among assessments are a popular subject of conversation. Such charges are hard to document, but if they are true, the process is strikingly similar to the tax-bargaining of centuries past.

Beyond the possibility of bargaining, the municipality has no flexibility in devising new sources of tax revenue. Opportunities for new taxes which appear as industrialisation changes the face of the city are often missed and city officials must look to Tehran for supplemental income. The semi-independent transportation authority is one example of this situation. With the rapid population growth, the transportation problem in the central city has become one of the main preoccupations of the municipality. The national government subsidises the authority's bus operations. Yet, when the authority's director devised a plan for a parking garage which would take cars off the street and raise revenue, he found that it had to be approved by the Governor and that the plan would probably be sent to Tehran for review.

What fiscal responsibilities are held locally are also held diffusely. Not one municipal administrator has comprehensive control over the *local* taxation system. Assessments, collections, and complaints are controlled by a variety of permanent and temporary agencies and mixed commissions. For example, the evaluation of property for the *no sazi* tax is handled by the *Momayezi*

Commission made up of one representative each from the Ministry of Finance, the city council and the *Edare Sabt* (which is essentially a licensed notary public). The Ministry of Justice and the governor are instrumental in taking over the property of delinquent taxpayers while the *Made Hasht* (a judge, a city councillor, and a "free expert") evaluates *no sazi* complaints.

Fiscal relationships between the public sector and the business community are mediated by the *otagh-e asnaf*. The *asnaf* are responsible today, just as they have been for centuries, for the collection of specific taxes from member enterprises and also are responsible for enforcing price regulations. In fact, in 1971, municipal authority became more dispersed than ever when guild courts took over price enforcement authority from the city, including the power to fine violators.

Recently, the Mayor of Mashhad, Massoud Mahdavi, voiced the widespread concern of municipal administrators over Tehran's willingness to undercut their authority[15]. He argued that "the first cornerstone of decentralisation is to let us manage our own civic affairs" and that the "guild chambers had not solved any problems" but "had added to the confusion". Mahdavi would like to see mayors put in charge of the guilds organisation. At the same time he stressed the need for increasing municipalities' taxing powers and giving them authority in the areas of water, power, and transportation.

The consolidation at the local level which Mahdavi wants to see is probably the most significant improvement which could be made in the present fiscal system. The financial straits within which Isfahan finds itself are duplicated in cities around the globe. Isfahan's difficulties are compounded by the lack of correspondence between those who pay for urban services and those who benefit from them. If decisions about which urban services should be expanded are to involve any local input, additional fiscal responsibility will also need to be assumed locally.

Conclusions

Iran is like other developing countries in that its national government has assumed many new functions in recent years and is now providing public services which were either non-existent before or lay within the scope of non-governmental institutions. What is perhaps somewhat unusual in Iran's case was the initial absence of well-established and locally-controlled urban governmental units at the beginning of the development period. At the outset, therefore, the central government's initiative in setting and implementing public policy was not often challenged by any urban local authorities.

The more recent municipal laws have done little to alter this situation. Control over most urban public services lies in the Tehran ministries. Although authority to hire and elect local functionaries is legally vested at the local level, national decision-makers are at least equally influential in selecting administrators, the mayor and city council members. Finally, the municipalities are impotent in fiscal affairs.

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[15] *Keyhan International*, August 11, 1971.

Iran's tentative experiment with political decentralisation suggests that such measures are not apt to be successful in settings where there is a history of centralised power, and where economic power is as unequally shared as it is between Tehran and the provinces, where legitimacy of the national regime is in question. No doubt the national government believes that its continued albeit often latent, refusal to allow the development of a really strong local authority is the best insurance of political stability. At the same time, while the geographic diversification of economic resources is encouraged, the incentives for industrial investment to flow to the provinces are diminished to the extent that all major political decisions are still made in Tehran.

An urban decision-making system, like Iran's, which is centralised and yet diffuse on the municipal level, creates a number of problems. The centralisation places burdens upon national administrators which increase proportionately to the expanding range of urban public services. The lack of co-ordination at the municipal level has led, in Isfahan at least, to some erratic patterns of urban growth. But perhaps the most severe problems raised within the city itself are those which affect the relationships between urban residents and municipal officials. It is difficult for municipal leaders to retain authority over their constituents when it is widely understood that the municipality is in effect simply an extension of the central government.

Much of the concern over urbanisation has been focused upon how to stem migration to the cities and, to a lesser extent, the political consequences of such migrations. The impact which existing political processes themselves have upon the public policy capabilities of non-primary urban areas is a subject which warrants much more attention than it has received.

The Development of Managil South-Western Extension to the Gezira Scheme — A Case Study*

By TAHA EL JACK TAHA

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THE Managil South-Western Extension is rightly considered a continuation of the early pumping irrigation trials carried out between 1908 and 1924. The experience gained in irrigated settlements under these pumping trials established a firm background for large-scale irrigated farming in the Gezira Scheme after the construction of Sennar Dam in 1925.

The limiting factor to the expansion of irrigated agriculture in the Gezira Scheme between 1925/26 and 1952/53, was the limited canal capacity and the restrictions imposed by the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement which gave the Sudan a 4 milliard cubic metres share out of the Nile waters with Egypt receiving 48 milliard. The conclusion of the Second Nile Waters' Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt in 1959, however, has raised the Sudan's share of the Nile waters to 18.5 milliard cubic metres and empowered the Government of the Sudan to proceed with the construction of Roseires Dam with a storage capacity of 2.7 milliard cubic metres of water in its first phase.

Land Development 1957-1970

The Managil Extension area lies to the South-West of the Gezira Scheme and was developed between the years 1957/58 and 1962/63 in five phases. Limitations arising from heterogeneity of soil types in phase 5 brought about a change in the development plan and recourse was had to suitable pockets of land in the vicinity of the Gezira/Managil area. Hence further suitable tracts of land were brought under irrigation during the years 1965/66 – 1969/70 and the table on facing page shows the phasing of development.

Land Tenure and Cropping Pattern

The Gezira system of land utilisation and land tenure, the sharing of the net proceeds of the cotton crop by the three partners, ie. Sudan Government, Sudan Gezira Board and Tenants according to an agreed ratio, and the permission for tenants to grow in rotation dura (sorghum) for consumption and lubia[1] as animal fodder was introduced into the Managil S.W. Extension from the very beginning. The only points of divergence were the 15-feddan

*This article is based on a paper presented on Feb. 10, 1975, at the EDI/IBRD Sudan Agricultural and Rural Development Projects Seminar held at the University of Khartoum.

[1] *Dolichos Lablab*, a leguminous fodder crop.

holding designed for the Managil S.W. Extension compared with the original Gezira holding of 40-feddans[2]. The reasons for the adoption of the 15-feddan holdings are:

a. that the small-size holding will provide full employment and a decent standard of living to the tenant and his family,
b. the smaller-sized holding means the distribution of holdings to more families, and thus ensures a wider distribution of income within the project.

The tripartite partnership on the cotton crop was an ingenious device combining the resources of the Government which provided the land and water (through investment in the construction of Sennar Dam and major canalisation network and paying land rents to land owners) with the resources of the Managing agency and the tenant cultivators who contributed no capital to the enterprise but entered the effective partnership by dint of their own labour on the cotton crop, from planting through to harvest and delivery of their crops for processing and marketing. The duties of every partner were clearly set out in the Gezira Scheme Ordinance (1950) and were revised in 1960.

Summary of Land Development and Settlement in Managil South-West Extension and the Gezira Extensions in the Sudan from 1957/58 to 1969/70 (Area in Feddans)

Year	*Phase*	*Gross in Fed*	*No. of Holdings*	*No. of Tenants*	*Cotton*
1957/58	I	197,467	13026	10962	65244
1958/59	II	221,277	14638	12390	73702
1959/60	III Part I	138,671	9035	7074	46063
1960/61	III Part II	86,263	5606	5079	28896
1960/61	IV Part I	60,193	3900	3142	19994
1961/62	IV Part II	75,477	4960	4271	25130
1962/63	V Part I	57,976	3245	2371	16736
Total Managil South-West Extension		837,324	54410	45289	275765
1965/66	Gez/Man Extensions	79,797	4174	3606	21393
1966/67	Gez/Man Extensions	60,844	3098	2826	15994
1967/68	Shawal Extension ..	63,415	3002	2794	15814
1968/69	Gez/Man Extension..	33,850	1632	1360	8399
1969/70	A/Magid Extension..	19,870	1250	1250	6621
Total Managil and Gezira/ Managil Extensions		1,095,100	67566	57225	343986

N.B.—Area under fallow is included in the Gross Area. 1 Feddan = 1.038 Acres = 0.42 Hectare.

[2]The Managil's tenant allocates every season 5 feddans to cotton, 2½ feddans to dura and 2½ feddans to either lubia or groundnuts, leaving 5 feddans fallow for the growing of cotton in the following season. In other words, figures relating to the areas occupied by Dura crops and by Lubia and Groundnuts, together, amount in each case to approximately 50 per cent of the cotton areas listed above.

Identification, Preparation and Appraisal

In the early years of the twentieth Century, surveys were carried out which came to the conclusion that the only natural asset was the Blue Nile and the fertile Gezira Plains which, with their gentle slope from the South to the North and from the East to the West made irrigation by gravity flow possible. Furthermore the Government with its very meagre resources was in dire need of a solid economic base. In a nutshell, the very problems facing the Government at the turn of the century led to the construction of the Sennar Dam and the development of the Gezira Scheme. The total capital outlay was £15 million. The appraisal of the Gezira loan for this amount, although unwritten, is easy because by 1950, ie. 25 years after the construction of Sennar Dam and the launching of the Gezira Scheme into full operation, the Government had accumulated a surplus of £16 million besides the 9 per cent dividend of the shareholders (The Sudan Plantations Syndicate)[3], and the net profit of the average tenant was £200 per annum.

The capital sunk in the construction of Roseires Dam was £60 million and the total investment in the Managil S.W.E. Extension's Five Phases was £46 million. The principal items of investment in the project area were the excavation of the main and minor canals, the eradication of the bush cover, land-levelling, the construction of regulators and crossings on the main major and minor canals, the construction of divisional and sub-divisional head-quarters and water-control points. The total investments also catered for the Sudan Gezira Board's infrastructural development in the extension of the Gezira light railway's network, the construction of Field Staff residential quarters and offices, warehouses, the sinking of borewells, the extension of the ginning factories, and procurement of additional agricultural machinery and implements.

There is no official record to prove that the sequence of agricultural project identification, preparation and appraisal was followed either in the original Gezira Scheme or later in the Managil South-West Extension. However, the solvency of the Gezira Scheme is proven by the repayment of the loan some thirty years after the inauguration of Sennar Dam and the Gezira Scheme under gravity irrigation. The economic soundness of the Managil S.W.E. is indicated by the cash flow, the internal rate of return and the share of the net proceeds of cotton, and the net profits from other crops which belong exclusively to the tenants.

Managil S.W. Extension's Contribution to the Sudan's Economy

The net returns from cotton and other crops are not the Gezira and Managil's total contribution to the Sudan's national economy, because there are indirect contributions deriving from levies on exports and imports, ie. export taxes and royalties on cotton lint and groundnuts, and duty paid on goods imported for use in the area.

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[3]The Sudan Plantations Syndicate (S.P.S.) was the Concessionnaire Company administering the Gezira Scheme from 1925 to 1950 and receiving 20 per cent of the net proceeds from cotton sales.

Net Returns from Cash Crops per 15-Feddan Holding in 1973/74 Season

The following table shows the net return from cash crops per 15-feddan holding in Managil S.W.E. in the 1973/74 season:

	Cotton	*G/nuts*	*Wheat*	*Total*
	(*Ls per feddan*)[4]			
Gross Return	67.928	34.922	32.267	—
Joint Cost of Production	36.561	15.581	14.545	—
Net Return to the Three Partners ..	31.367	19.341	17.722	—
Net Return to Tenant Excluding Individual Account for Cotton (49%) ..	15.370	19.341	17.722	52.433

N.B.—Cost of production for groundnuts and wheat is the total cost (Individual Account).

Source: Agricultural Economics Section Planning and Development Dept S.G.B. Extracted from Annual Economic Surveys Report 1973/74.

Net Returns from Cash Crops per 15-Feddan Holding in Managil S.W.E. L.s.

	Yield/Fed	*Net Return per Fedd.*	*No of Feds*	*Total*
Cotton	5.243 (Kantar)[5]	15.370	5	76.850
Wheat	0.509 (M.T.)[6]	17.722	$3\frac{3}{4}$	66.458
Groundnuts	0.599 (M.T.)	19.341	$2\frac{1}{2}$	48.353
Total				191.661

Tenants other Income per 15-Feddan Holdings

	Yield M.T./ Fed.	*Gross Return* Ls/m/ms	*Cost of Prod.* Ls/m/ms	*Net Return* Ls/m/ms	*No. of Fedd.* Ls/m/ms	*Total*
Dura ..	0.375	16.963	8.760	8.203	$1\frac{1}{4}$	10.253
Lubia ..	—	—	—	—	—	—
Livestock Veget. and Philip ..						30.000
					Total	40.253

[4]LS = Sudanese Pounds. 1000 Milliemes = 100 piastres = one Ls.
[5]1 Kantar = 315 lbs. of unginned cotton.
[6]Metric tons.

Tenants Net Annual Income (Ls. m/ms)	
Returns from Cash Crops (Cotton, G/nuts, Wheat)	191.661
Returns from other Enterprises	40.253
Total	231.914
Minus: Hired Labour Cost for Cotton at the Rate of L.s.5.686/Fed.	28.430—
Total	203.484

How did this successful scheme materialise?

In 1956 the Sudan Gezira Board set up a Development department to undertake all activities relating to the Sudan Gezira Board, and to liaise with all Government Units concerned with the development of the project area. However, in an endeavour aimed at achieving better co-ordination between Ministries and Departments of Government and the Sudan Gezira Board, the Managil Joint Committee was created in 1956, under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation & Hydroelectric Power with a direct responsibility to the Minister. The functions of this Committee were to study, co-ordinate, follow up and consolidate the work of the Ministries and Departments entrusted with the extension of the Managil Extension.

The execution of the Managil Scheme for which the Committee was made responsible implied the following further functions:

(a) Preparation of designs for major and minor canalisation, major and minor regulators and for the construction of houses for field staff and workers,

(b) Execution of approved designs,

(c) Survey of the project area and assessment of the amount of bush cover and levelling requirements,

(d) Organising land settlement and/or resettlement, survey work and mapping of plots (in sections subject to registration) to ascertain title to agricultural land,

(e) Alphabetical listing of landowners to the distribution of holdings to landowners and land-users alike (once the former category is satisfied with the correctness of the list),

(f) Conducting a social survey of the project area to establish social service needs for a semi-nomadic rural population.

Choice of the Area for Cultivation and Settlement

The Managil Extension which adjoins the Gezira Main Scheme in a South-Westerly direction, was the granary of the Sudan before Gezira scheme was started. However, it was left undeveloped for years to provide a reservoir of cotton pickers for the Scheme. Finally action was taken after the attainment of independence and in an attempt to utilise more fully available land and water resources so as to generate the new revenue required to meet the expanding services which a rapidly-growing population demanded. It was then that the development of the Managil South West Extension was

fitted into the closing stages of the five-year development plan 1951-56 and was later incorporated in the ten-year plan of Economic and Social Development 1961-70/71. The last Gezira/Managil Extension development was duly covered by the 5-year plan 1970/71-1974/75.

Financing of Development

The Four Phases of the Managil South-Western Extension Project were originally planned for development in four equal phases of 200,000 feddans each, on the assumption that the net proceeds of sale of cotton from each phase would finance the subsequent phase. However, the recession in cotton prices which occurred in 1959 made this impossible, and necessitated a revision of the development plan to reduce the pace of expansion. Eventually a loan of $15.5 million was obtained from the World Bank in 1960 to meet the foreign currency requirements of implementing phases III and IV. According to the World Bank Mission's appraisal report, the standard Managil Extension Holding was expected to yield a net return of Ls.90 to the individual tenant from cotton and other crops after the deduction of the cost of hired labour. The return on the investment worked out by the World Bank Mission in 1960 was 11.6 per cent.

Human and Ecological Factors

As already mentioned, the inhabitants of the Managil South-West Extension were the traditional picking labour force of the Gezira Main Scheme, numbering some 75,000 workers.

Once Phase One of the Managil extension was completed the Managil to Gezira labour movement dwindled year by year. Each developed phase not only robbed the Gezira Main Scheme of its traditional cotton pickers, but entered into direct competition with it for labour as the erstwhile pickers were established as tenant-cultivators on their own. Hence the policy adopted by the Government and the Sudan Gezira Board with effect from the 1961/62 season to facilitate the inflow of labour from the Western Sudan into the Gezira and Managil for cotton picking, and the offering of subsidies to the Gezira and Managil tenant-cultivators to recruit labour from the Eastern Banks of the Blue and White Niles[7].

Planning of Settlement

The Managil Extension was superimposed on the existing pattern of villages. Large villages not lying on the central lines of main, major and minor canalisation and drainage lines were left *in situ* and re-planned. Furthermore,

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[7]The Labour force engaged on picking the 1973/74 cotton crop in the Gezira Main and Managil S.W.E.

	Tenants and Families	Resident Labour	Imported Labour	Casual Labour	Total
Gezira ..	77987	39284	151547	6365	275183
Managil ..	60992	18174	184377	2889	266432
Total	138979	57458	355924	9254	541615

scattered villages accessible to one another were grouped on new sites with a view to the provision of social services, and in completely uninhabited areas of part II of phase Three, new villages were carved out and provided with social services.

The village planning committee, a sub-Committee of the Managil Joint Committee, decided from the very beginning that each village precinct should not be less than 270 feddans for the smallest village and 540 feddans for the largest. The residential plots in every village were planned to meet the immediate requirements of tenant-cultivators and the local inhabitants, and also to suffice demand amounting to a further 50 per cent. The villages are located within a radius of not more than 5 kilometres from the agricultural rotations where tenant-cultivators had their holdings. A number of villages were selected as civic centres where social services were to be concentrated, eg. schools for boys and girls, dispensaries and veterinary clinics, bore-wells or filtration plants, village halls, bakeries and flourmills etc. However, most of the ordinary villages were provided with bore-wells where underground water was found to be fresh, or with surface water treatment plants (filtration plants) where underground water was too saline for human consumption.

The salinity of underground water in phases II and III of Managil and the presence of a granite layer obstructing prospecting for underground water, led to the Managil Joint Committee's panel of engineers designing (i) a filtration plant to take crude water from a minor canal which is passed through a strainer to a sedimentation tank, and (ii) a filtration tank from which clean water is pumped up into a reservoir perched up 20 feet high for the supply of potable water to the village community.

W.H.O. was approached to help in modification of the design, routine maintenance of the filtration plant tanks and chlorination of the potable water before use. W.H.O. seconded a short-term consultant for three months in 1965, and offered a scholarship at the Imperial College of Science and Technology for one of the Civil Engineers of the Board to study sanitary engineering for an academic year.

In the light of the consultant's report modifications were introduced and routine maintenance and chlorination were effected, and as a result the filtration plants are providing properly treated drinking water to the rural population in the Managil area.

W.H.O. assisted again, in 1966, by seconding Technical Staff for six months to train water supply personnel from Gezira/Managil and from municipal authorities in the Sudan.

The Planning of Specialised Services

Specialised services in the Managil Extension were planned by the village planning committee, which was a sub-committee of the Managil Joint Committee, and all the social services were financed centrally from the development budget. The provision of social services in phases I-IV cost Ls.2.5 million out of a total capital investment of Ls.46 million.

In addition to this expenditure, other social services were provided by the Social Development Department out of its 3 per cent share of the net proceeds of the cotton crop. Such services covered special training farms for tenants' sons, social research, grants for school buildings, recreational and sports clubs, the circulation of the arabic weekly newspaper, "El Gezira", the operation of mobile cinema units, assistance to the co-operative movement, horticultural services, the establishment of forestry plots for the production of firewood, poles and rafters for building purposes, a building research programme aimed at the investigation of low-cost building techniques, drilling of borewells, anti-malaria and anti-bilharzia campaigns in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, spraying of villages with D.D.T., social welfare work, adult education services, apprenticeship classes for young artisans etc. Thus a full range of social services is provided for the tenants and other full and part-time residents on the Scheme. The rising standard of living of the tenants and the local population create more social needs, and the rapid pace of urbanisation is widening the gap between the town and the countryside.

Self-Help Activities

The purpose of self-help projects is to make the tenants and local inhabitants alive to their day-to-day needs. Furthermore, through self-help projects they are given the chance to participate effectively in the improvement of their social life.

The basis of self-help projects is to offer a grant-in-aid not exceeding 50 per cent of the total cost towards approved social projects. The Local Community must meet the balance. To date a sum of 20,000 pounds Sudanese has been made available to self-help projects in Managil villages in the South West Extension.

Timing of Planning and Execution of Plans

The execution of phases I and II of the Managil Extension started two years ahead of the planting season. Phase III was hit by the recession in international cotton prices, and depressingly low yields in 1957/58 season, with the result that the development of this phase was split into two sub-phases. The first was started nine months ahead of the planting season, and the staff and labourers had to work overtime and rush land-levelling and bush eradication operations, with the result that some of the development commitments, especially in connection with the construction of staff quarters, had to be deferred and members of the staff had no alternative to sharing accommodation or living away from their families. The settlement of new tenant-cultivators was most problematical, because new villages had to be started from scratch, and the late allocation of holdings did not leave much time for putting up makeshift shelters. The village Planning Committee realised from the very outset that the new settlers were poor and needed a subsidy for constructing dwelling houses and this was granted by the Central Government.

The execution of the second sub-phase and of part I of phase IV started 18 clear months ahead of the planting season. The area concerned was

practically devoid of settlements because of the lack of fresh underground water. Hence, number one headache to the Managil Joint Committee was the design and construction of filtration plants fed from the irrigation canals.

The execution of part II of phase IV started 12 clear months ahead of the planting season, and the area being densely populated and dotted with hand-dug wells, there were no settlement problems.

The execution of part I of phase V started 10 months ahead of schedule and the development work dragged on for two more planting seasons owing to the time taken on the excavation of the canalisation and drainage lines, field ditches and laterals carried out as a result of a reconnaissance soil survey which was made available in January 1963. The publication of the semi-detailed soil survey and land classification report conducted by a foreign consulting firm, necessitated many changes in the alignment of canalisation and the revision of the allocation of holdings. The trouble taken in phase V part I was of great significance to Sudanese planners, and the lesson was learnt with the result that development work in the following extensions was preceded by a semi-detailed soil survey and land classification.

The execution of the Gezira/Managil Extensions in the years 1965/66-1969/70 was started 6-9 months ahead of the planting season. The distribution of social services to these extensions as an integral part of the development budget was discontinued for lack of resources, and the tenant-cultivators had to wait in the queue for their turn to obtain social services from the Social Development Department when its income from cotton sales was apportioned.

Channels of Communication

The agricultural extension service was set up in the 1969/70 season. A full-time Director of Extension was appointed for the first time assisted by a group of extension officers who had training abroad. In 1969/70 five Blocks were selected for the start of the agricultural extension service among the tenant-cultivators. The aims of the service were set out as follows:

i. Making the utmost use of existing potentialities in the Scheme for the enhancement of production in the interest of the tenant and the country as a whole;
ii. Absorption and dissemination of agricultural research findings;
iii. The gradual relaxation of central supervision and control by the Field Inspectors and introduction of extension officers by training the Field Inspectors in extension methods.

Conclusions

The capacity of the fixed holdings in the Gezira and Managil Scheme to absorb a rising population must be the subject of intensive research. The rural population in these areas tends to prefer salaried jobs in key towns where industrial and service sectors are offering fixed wages rather than working on the land. Furthermore, there is a disparity between agricultural and industrial wages. The rate of urbanisation although presently low, is gathering momentum; rural/urban migrants are being attracted by the

opportunities offered in the towns. There is a real danger that agriculture will be robbed of its labour force unless remedial measures are taken to locate processing industries in rural areas in order to maintain a proper balance between investment in agriculture and in industry and between the needs of the towns and the countryside.

The chronic position of the Gezira and Managil tenants based on fixed land holdings calls for immediate measures to raise the income levels and the standard of living of the tenants and labour force in agriculture with the object of improving their efficiency. This will require increased investment in agriculture and agricultural extension and training aimed at the encouragement of more intensive methods and greater investment in human development.

Fixed landholders and the sub-division of the original 40-acre Gezira holdings as a result of population pressure, call for continuous research and evaluation for the following reasons:

(i) There has always been a tendency to consider the success of the Gezira Scheme in terms of agricultural output and productivity from a national and not from an individual tenant's point of view. Hence, overall production figures reigned supreme in any report or accounts analysis sheet. Such considerations are essential for the evaluation of the performance of the Scheme as a leading national production sector, but there is an advantage also in considering the point of view of individual tenant-cultivators.

A microscopic view of agricultural holdings gives support to the conception of agricultural holdings as production units rather than administrative units in a land distribution scheme. Furthermore, this microscopic view lays emphasis on the economic factors of production at work in every single holding, viz, land, labour and capital as well as on the optimum size of holdings, the amount of labour which can be economically employed viz family and hired labour or machinery and the extent to which production requisites can best be brought into operation.

(ii) In the Gezira and Managil Schemes reference is made to the size of holdings in terms of cotton as the principal crop so far, but this conception is now repudiated in many circles in view of recent specialisation in other remunerative produce from small-holdings such as vegetable growing, dairying and poultry enterprises especially when there are markets close at hand.

(iii) The intensification and diversification of cropping is one of several ways to increase incomes of small farmers on fixed holdings. This requires departure from the prevailing culture and the adoption of double cropping or specialisation in intensive livestock and horticultural production. Greater intensification and diversification of crop and animal production will enable tenant-cultivators and family and hired labour to be constantly engaged over the year thereby reducing unemployment and underemployment. More intensive cultivation could be practised, for example, by using more irrigation water and fertilisers.

(iv) There has been a continuous debate on whether the small or large agricultural holding is more productive. Hence, the importance of economic studies in tenancy farming to gather data over several years on numerous and representative holdings before passing a judgement.

(v) The Gezira/Managil Scheme is undergoing a vast change in cropping pattern. In September 1974 it was announced that (a) low-yielding areas amounting to 200,000 feddans will be removed from cotton-growing, (b) wheat and groundnuts areas will be increased to 600,000 and 400,000 feddans respectively, (c) vegetables will be grown on 50,000 feddans, (d) rice growing will be increased to 25,000 feddans, (e) the three-course rotation in Managil will be 100 per cent intensive and the 4-course rotation in the Gezira Scheme will be 75 per cent intensive, (f) areas removed from cotton will be planted to summer fodders, groundnuts or vegetables.

(vi) In addition to these changes which are largely attributed to the slow disposal of the cotton crops, other changes are under consideration:

a. increasing mechanisation, ie. full mechanisation of an area of 50,000 feddans to be planted with groundnuts in 1975/76 and 40,000 feddans to be planted with cotton;

b. the provision of warehousing for 40,000 tons of wheat;

c. the establishment of decortication to cope with the groundnuts crop;

d. the establishment of oil extraction plants;

e. increasing beef and sheep production for local consumption, and exports of concentrates from grain, oilcake, molasses, etc. with increased production of the crops concerned.

All these problems warrant intensive investigation in the short and long-term.

Some Issues in the Social Development of Nigerian Agriculture

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Introduction

The role of agriculture in the economic development of nations has been the subject of much discussion. In the Nigerian economy, the role of agriculture has been dominant, for it contributes over 50 per cent of the national income and employs over 75 per cent of the country's labour force. Before 1958 when petroleum was first exported, agriculture's contribution was about 75 per cent of the total value of Nigerian exports. Despite the imposition of a producer tax which has in the past severely affected the income of farmers, and the decline in the earnings of some principal export crops (eg Cocoa, Palm Kernels, Palm Oil and Groundnuts), agricultural produce still contributes more than 50 per cent of the national income[1].

Thus, even with the present oil boom, agriculture still retains a major place within the Nigerian economy. "Whatever policy is formulated, agriculture is likely to continue to provide income and employment for the bulk of Nigeria's labour force, to provide the domestic food needs for a substantial majority of the population, to remain a source of foreign exchange for the national economy, and to contribute some of the inputs needed for the growing domestic industries"[2] Despite the obvious importance of agriculture in the economy, however, the rate of growth of the agricultural sector has been very low in Nigeria. Thus the present growth rate of 1.5 per cent p.a. contrasts with the rate of population growth at 2.5 to 3.0 per cent. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, in 15 of 39 developing African countries, per capita agricultural production in 1971 fell below the average for 1961-65, and, as shown in Table 1, Nigeria comes very close to the bottom of this production league table[3].

The poor performance in the rate of Nigeria's agriculture production has been a subject that has occupied the attention of policy makers. In this paper, attention is focussed on land tenure as a social development factor affecting Nigerian agriculture. The first part of the paper engages in broad

[1]Dupe Olatunbosun and S. Olajuwon Olayide: Effects of the Marketing Boards on the Output and Income of Primary Producers. International Conference on the Marketing Board System, 29 March to 3 April, 1971.

[2]Norman, D. W.: Initiating Change in Traditional Agriculture. Paper read at a Symposium on "The Role of Agriculture in the Post-War Economic Development of Nigeria". Nigerian Agricultural Society Conference, Ibadan, July 1, 1970.

[3]Preliminary version of the Annual Review of the Food and Agriculture Organisation. F.A.O., United Nations, Rome, 1972.

discussions about the relationships in land tenure. This is followed by an examination of the social and political objectives of land tenure systems with reference to Nigeria. The final part summarises and concludes the paper.

TABLE 1

Average per capita production levels in some African countries in 1971 (Index comparison to base of 100 for 1961-65)

Country	*Production Levels*
Niger	98
Mauritania	97
Algeria	94
Guinea	94
Upper Volta	94
Mauritius	93
Chad	92
Dahomey	89
Somalia	88
Congo	87
Lesotho	86
Rhodesia	84
Nigeria	82
Central African Republic	9

Source: Annual Review of the F.A.O., Rome, 1972.

Relationships in Agricultural Land Tenure

From the point of view of agriculture, our interest in land lies in its use for present farming purposes and in ensuring that the land is adequately maintained and preserved for future purposes. Here, the issues of tenure of land arise only as they affect present use, maintenance and improvement. From the point of view of the farmer as an economic entrepreneur, however, our pre-occupation may be more with tenure of land than with its beneficial occupation. In practice, however, the relationships are never fully exclusive, rather, they are intertwined. The conditions that affect land use invariably affect the land tenure system and *vice versa*. Also, effects of external factors on land use affect the tenure of land so that a reciprocal relationship between land use and land tenure can be recognised.

But, in using land, interest in investment for the future is more crucial and important than in the present use for agricultural purposes. Thus many individual or group entrepreneurs show more interest in investing in land for future gains than in maximising their profits from current uses of land. In fact, in many human societies, emphasis is placed more on the property aspects of the land than in its potentiality as a resource for agricultural production. In such societies, property rights acquired by a person tend to determine his social status or prestige. On the other hand, the lack of property rights may restrict an individual's rights of citizenship. Furthermore, an unscrupulous or short-sighted entrepreneur may be tempted for

love of short-term gains to maximise his returns in the short run by taking measures which 'mine' the soil through progressive depletion of soil nutrients without the concomitant adoption of good husbandry practices.

Systems of land tenure are themselves products of the social institutions of different human societies. These systems are therefore closely related to the laws and customs that operate in the various communities. In some of these, land tenure systems are closely connected to systems of marriage. For instance, there have been cases in some Nigerian communities where the status of an agricultural worker has been enhanced when he takes the farmer's daughter as wife[4]. Moreover, systems of tenure have been very closely related to the structure of the family. This close relationship is often manifest between systems of tenure and systems of inheritance.

In most Nigerian communities, for instance, the basis of land-holding is the family. All members of the family have a stake in the family land and no one may be deprived of the right to farm the land and enjoy the fruits that the land may yield. On the death of an occupier of family land, his portion reverts to the family pool. At birth, an individual accedes to his right as a member of a land-holding unit. The right also prevails when the laws of inheritance become operational, for at the death of an occupier of family land, although his portion of land is drawn into the existing pool, nevertheless his children cannot be disinherited especially if the occupier has died testate and has indicated that his property be divided among his surviving children.

It would appear that more than half of Nigeria's farmland is held by families in accordance with customary law. Table 2 shows the amounts so held in 1970/71, State by State.

There are also other patterns of tenurial control of land such as by the whole village through the village head, through purchase and sales, loans, rent and gift. These forms which are grouped in Table 2 under "others" are not included in the discussion here. The high percentage of farmlands under the control of the family through the family head in Southern Nigeria is consistent with the basis of land ownership in that part of the country. The case of the Northern States is illuminating and interesting because in theory, the basis of landownership is the State. In practice, however, a large percentage of total farmlands is under the direct control of family groups through the acknowledged family head.

The systems of land tenure are thus affected and determined by marriage and family systems, inheritance systems as well as the traditional laws and customs of the community. Apart from its relationship with these systems emanating from the family, land tenure has been defined very properly as a systematised body of working rules devised by society to determine access to agricultural land, and to retain a reasonable degree of accessibility. In the operation of the working rules, social relationships develop among men, these relationships among men in the control and use of land, constitute the major aspect of any land tenure sustem, and are also closely related to the

[4]Adegboye, R. O.: Farm Tenancy in Western Nigeria. *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies.* Volume 8, Number 3, November, 1966.

existing systems of government. This latter relationship may not be profound in countries that either have recently achieved political independence or are yet to assert their political and economic independence. Thus theories such as the "divine right of kings", "monarchy", "liberal democracy", "socialism", "communism", "capitalism", and so on, are both theories of government and land tenure in the sense that the type of tenure system that emerges under a particular system of government is a result of the directions, objectives and motivations of the particular system of government. It is also often the result of an ideological commitment.

It should be stressed, however, that in countries like Nigeria, where agriculture constitutes the major source of income for a large proportion of the population, the ideal situation is one in which systems of land tenure and government become interdependent. This ideal situation culminates in one in which the system of government that emerges continues to refine, direct and modify or adjust the existing land tenure system so that the latter can play its role effectively in promoting the social development of agriculture.

TABLE 2

Tenure Patterns based on Family and Inheritance in Nigeria 1970/71 (Percentage of Total Acreage)[5]

States	*Family*	*Inheritance*	*Others**	*Total*
North Central	62.34	11.36	26.30	100.00
North Eastern	58.58	7.66	33.76	100.00
North Western	57.96	—	42.04	100.00
Benue Plateau	66.08	9.37	24.55	100.00
Kano	51.85	19.30	28.85	100.00
Kwara	43.17	14.94	41.89	100.00
Western	56.02	17.36	26.62	100.00
East Central	41.68	34.40	23.92	100.00
South Eastern	57.61	3.82	38.57	100.00
Rivers	47.61	0.75	51.64	100.00
Mid Western	39.37	43.56	17.07	100.00
Lagos	45.46	17.16	37.38	100.00
NIGERIA	55.49	12.49	32.02	100.00

Source: Culled from: Rural Economic Survey of Nigeria. Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria, March 1973.

*See text for explanation on "others".

[5]Figures in the Inheritance Column show the proportion of lands under the control of heirs—that is, *not* under the control of the family head, and include land left by a father to a particular child by means of a written testament *or* by an oral deathbed statement made in the presence of witnesses. Such devolution must be respected under customary law. Apart from these specific instances *most* of the customary-held lands revert to the family pool at the death of the holder—hence the comparative low figure shown in this column.

Social and Political Objectives in Land Tenure Policies

To reiterate the point previously made, an ideal situation with regard to the land tenure system, is one in which the State guides the development of the system so that the social development of agriculture can be promoted. In formulating any social policy on land tenure, there are certain social and political objectives that should be incorporated. These objectives are categorised in Table 3 under political stability, economic progress and social progress which comes through the attainment of some degree of social justice. The meanings of these categories of objectives in the context of land tenure are summarily annotated in Table 3.

Some of these goals or objectives may now be related to the customary tenure system as it operates in Nigeria. In this exercise, reference is made to some of the salient features of Table 3. This should help to identify some of the virtues as well as the shortcomings of the customary tenure system in Nigeria.

TABLE 3

Social and Political Objectives in a Land Tenure Policy


POLITICAL STABILITY
Preservation of open and democratic institutions.
Preventing the developing of a propertyless class within the farming community.
ECONOMIC PROGRESS
Conservation and development of physical resources, that is, incentives to land conservation and improvement. Availability of new areas. Control of erosion.
Highly efficient utilisation of productive resources, that is, through technology, flexibility, forms of economic units, prevention of fragmentation, increase in levels of output.
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Equitable distribution of income
Equitable distribution of rights in landed property (recognition of rights)
Equality and dignity in opportunity
Integrated (social) rural community
OPPORTUNITY
PRODUCTION
Opportunity for production of crops, for tenants to become owners and farm workers who aspire to become cultivators on their own account
CONTROL OF CREDIT
Finance of agriculture; opportunity for investments in agriculture, opportunity for capital formation
MARKET
Creation of an infrastructure, accessibility to markets, provision of good feeder roads, improved market information, better marketing arrangements and credit facilities

Firstly, by ensuring equitable distribution of rights to land, the Nigerian customary tenure system has for centuries avoided the emergence of a class of landless men and has avoided, too, land speculators invading the rural areas. Thus the right of every member of a family to occupy and use a piece of land ensures that he and his family can provide both food and a certain amount of income for themselves.

Secondly, the customary tenure system has made some contribution to the economic progress of the country particularly through the opportunity that it has provided for numerous farmers to expand their tree crop enterprises. Over the years these cash crops – which include cocoa, oil palm, kola and rubber – have become the propeller of Nigeria's economic progress. To set against the virtues of the customary tenure system, however, an important disadvantage can be cited. This is that since Nigeria has entered a period of rapid development, the system has proved unequal to the task; for land development in many parts of the country, particularly in the North, has involved large-scale farming. Since no provision is made for securing the use of land for such schemes under customary tenure, the establishment of such major schemes has resulted in the loss of small parcels of land belonging to numerous individual farmers. This creates a problem of social injustice to the farmers who lose their lands.

Furthermore, although the so-called 'egalitarian' principle of a piece of land to every member of the family ensures security for family survival, this is not the case for those outside the 'family circle'. One of the working rules of customary tenure is the inalienability of land to individuals outside the clan. This rule has promoted community exclusiveness, and in some cases, has restricted the mobility of customary tenants who are otherwise favourably disposed to moving to areas where resources are underutilised. In other cases where the rule applies, money-lenders and wealthy landlords are nonetheless in a position to acquire 'inalienable' lands under mortgages[6]. Also, in cases where land is needed for public purposes likely to benefit members of neighbouring village communities the acquisition of 'inalienable' land can raise problems. Even though one village community may consent to the acquisition of such land another may not. The reason for withholding consent may be that most of the villagers are members of the same clan and are fully committed to preserving their inalienable rights. It may also be that there is a territorial dispute in the sense that "there is no agreement on any boundary point throughout the whole length of the borderland.[7]. When this occurs the contestant/communities usually resort to stating historical episodes to reinforce their case.

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[6]While lands held under customary tenure systems are not alienable (except with the full consent of members of the landowning units), such lands have often been mortgaged by the rightholder; but it is a temporary process. The land is always redeemable by the debtor once the debt has been completely discharged. Occasionally, however, complications do arise when the mortgagee or his descendants may seek to convert this temporary arrangement into one of absolute transfer of title to the land. Under the customary land law, though, delay in discharging debt payment does not convert the *mere usufruct* in land to *proprietary* (ie. absolute) rights in land.

[7]Adejuyigbe, Omolade: Types and Causes of Local Boundary Disputes in Western Nigeria. Paper presented at Seminar in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ife, 11 February, 1970.

The fact that the customary system has for centuries encouraged the cultivation of food crops must be cited as an important merit of the system. But the corollary to this is that it has not been possible to generate adequate agricultural surpluses for development. The relevant issues here are really three-fold. They relate to the kind of opportunity that exists under the customary tenure system for the exercise of individual control of land use, for the availability of credit, and for selling any marketable surplus. The three issues are interrelated (see Table 3). As indicated earlier, the individual holds clearly defined rights to the land that belongs to all members of the community. As production increases and the prospect of a marketable surplus comes in sight, the major constraint that arises (apart from those of customary tenure) is the lack of provision for an adequate infrastructure. With regard to customary tenure and credit, there is no direct relationship between the two. An indirect relationship however arises in cases where it is required that titles to land shall be the security for credit, and only where this occurs can it be said that customary tenure has been deficient. The reason for this deficiency is that under the customary tenure system, the existence of group or family ownership constitutes a real constraint on the opportunity for credit, since individual members of the group cannot use family-owned land as security, assuming that Banks are willing to accept land as collateral for capital loans. Without a clear, legally-defensible title to land, where such is required, managers of commercial banks are unable to grant loans to farmers[8].

Finally, the individual farmer as a member of the community, it will be recalled, is subject to the working rules and social sanctions of that community. This subjection to the working rules of society is essential to the orderly functioning of an integrated rural community. Perhaps it is in the attainment of this social objective most of all that the customary tenure system in Nigeria has excelled. In the rural areas, the elements which make for an integrated rural community are apparent. These elements are indeed part of the Nigerian heritage: devotion to common goals of society, common behaviour with a common purpose, principles of reciprocity, redistribution, respect for elders, ability to surrender willingly to sanctions imposed by society, and so on. Such an integration of the rural community has made for stable rural life, the latter being manifested in the uninterrupted schooling of rural youth, although with less facilities than in the urban areas, participation of individual members in community action – programmes, and the smooth functioning of rural community institutions. Thus there is a reciprocity between a stable land tenure system and a stable rural institution.

Summary and Conclusion

In this brief paper, an attempt has been made to discuss some of the issues that are relevant to the social development of Nigerian agriculture, issues that are related directly to the customary tenure system which over the years has provided the basis for agricultural production in Nigeria.

[8]It may be noted that the Nigerian farmer can seek to obtain credit from a variety of other sources also, eg. the 'ensusu' (an indigenous private thrift organisation), co-operatives, government credit institutions, private produce buyers and farm suppliers, village or compound heads, and private money-lenders.

The role and present position of agriculture in the Nigerian economy has therefore been examined. Land tenure as a system of social relationships among men as individuals, and between men and land has various other relationships attached to it, which condition its development. These relationships such as the family, marriage and hereditary systems have been discussed.

Attention has been drawn to an important interrelationship between systems of government and that of the land tenure system, and an analysis made of the social and political objectives that could be incorporated into land tenure policies. The salient features of these goals have been discussed in relation to the customary tenure system in Nigeria, and this paved the way for brief comments on the merits and demerits of the Nigerian customary tenure system.

The major conclusion which this leads us to is that the Nigerian customary tenure system while admirable in many respects needs to be improved so that it can meet the requirements of modern agriculture. The improvement is essential if Nigerian farmers are to be involved in the social development of agriculture. The modernisation of the land tenure system, as that of agriculture, is a formidable task. In order to ensure its success, the State should spearhead the process through the formulation of a land tenure policy on the basis of clearly defined objectives, some of which have been mentioned in this paper.

Specifically, the Federal Government should constitute the ultimate policy maker, whose policies on land tenure should be reflected in practical terms in the customary tenure systems that exist in each of the twelve states of the Nigerian Federation. In order to facilitate this, the Federal Government should not limit its role to supply of funds, but also to the supply of technical knowledge, skill and experience that will work conjointly with Local Authority and State officials in all parts of the country.

Emergency Administration: A Study of Drought-Relief Operations in an Indian State

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THIS paper is based on a study of the structure and operation of the different levels of administration in an actual emergency situation.

During 1970 to 1973, vast areas of the Maharashtra State in India were afflicted by unprecedented drought. The state government had to undertake large-scale relief operations so as to:

i. assure an adequate supply of food and water,

ii. provide employment opportunities,

iii. safeguard public health,

iv. assure an adequate supply of fodder at least for productive cattle which it is essential to keep alive.

The magnitude of the problem is shown by the size of the rural labour force which had to be engaged on various kinds of government-organised works during the peak months of scarcity; during 1973 labour attendance figures totalled 3.5 million in March, 5 million in May and 4.7 million in June. The main policy objective laid down during drought relief operations was to contain the villagers in their localities by providing jobs within about 5 kms of the affected area.

The following extracts from the Instructions issued by the Government of Maharashtra[1] indicate the way in which it was planned to meet the worsening disaster situation.

"The collectors should in consultation with (i) district officers of the various departments concerned with the execution of scarcity works, viz Buildings and Communications Department, Irrigation and Power Department, Agriculture and Co-operation Department as also (ii) Chief Executive Officers of the Zilla Parishads and (iii) Members of the District Relief Committee, immediately formulate a district plan containing a programme of scarcity works to be undertaken for the next four to six months from November 1972. The programme should be phased monthwise with as much precision as possible so that the details about the total works to be undertaken in a month, the estimated cost of the work, and the labour potential on the works are known in advance.

[1] *G.C.R. and F.D. No. SCY-1372/J*, of 1 November, 1972.

"In preparing the district plan, the following order of priority for taking up work should be observed:

i. Soil Conservation and contour bunding.
ii. Minor irrigation tanks works and excavation of canals for irrigation projects.
iii. Percolation Tanks.
iv. Metal Breaking.
v. Road making and repairing.

From the plan so drawn, the Collector shall sanction from time to time such works which can be started immediately, after considering the (various relevant) factors."

The Bombay Scarcity Manual

Administrative organisation for scarcity relief operations was discussed and procedures evolved long before Independence. During the British regime, three scarcity Commissions were successively constituted to investigate the nature and causes of famines, assess relief measures and recommend a proper system of administration for future guidance. The First, in 1880, realised the need for advance action to deal with this kind of emergency, and framed a model code, widely known as the Famine Code, which contained detailed organisational and operational instructions. The Famine Relief Code for the old Bombay Province was drafted in 1885, and remained in force until 1954 when it was replaced by the *Bombay Scarcity Manual*[2] which was drafted in order to up-date procedures (including advance planning) required to deal with the severe drought condition which had continued, after Independence, to plague a number of districts at regular intervals.

It is this Manual which, with some modifications, guides today the administration of emergency operations during periods of scarcity. What kind of organisation will be mounted in a scarcity situation and where the responsibility lies for carrying out the various functions involved, in fact, all kinds of organisational and operational details have been methodically codified in this Manual.

There are frequent references to the Manual in many of the government orders issued in recent times in Maharashtra, either to emphasise particular points therein or to make needed alterations to the old provisions. Administration is a live process and its operating norms naturally require modification from time to time so as to adapt it to new circumstances. The very fact that the Government of Maharashtra had to publish two volumes of orders issued during the period 1970-73, confirms this statement[3]. To integrate all these orders, properly, a new Scarcity Manual will surely be required before long.

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[2]P. 16 of the 1962 edition explains that "Scarcity is a marked deterioration of the agricultural season due to the failure of rains or floods or damage to crops from insects, resulting in severe unemployment and consequent distress among agricultural labour and small cultivators".

[3]*Scarcity: A Compendium of Government Orders*, Vols. I and II, Revenue and Forests Department, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1973.

Structure of Relief Organisation

The structure of the relief organisation which was set up during the recent period of scarcity can best be described in terms of levels of administration.

(*a*) *Organisation at Government Headquarters*

Under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister the State's Cabinet Sub-Committee on Scarcity consisted of the Ministers of Finance, Revenue, Agriculture, Irrigation and Buildings and Communications. The Chief Minister's intense involvement in the relief operations had a dynamic effect on the administration. His, too, was the task of seeking the co-operation of the political parties, visiting Delhi frequently to get funds from the Central Government, touring the affected districts, and thus lending a touch of warm humanism to the bureaucratic operations.

The Secretariat organisation achieved a united approach through a Secretaries' Committee presided over by the Chief Secretary. Apart from ensuring harmonious government action, the Committee had the important responsibility of framing strategic policies which were to guide the field administration, keeping a constant and vigilant watch on the crisis situation as it evolved, procuring funds and tools and implements to facilitate unimpeded operations on the ground. The Revenue and Forests Department held a key position, providing the co-ordinating Committee with its Secretary, acting as the vital two-way link between field operations and the secretariat and maintaining an overall view of the administration of the Scarcity Relief. As to which functional departments were most involved depended on the actual relief works concerned, eg. soil conservation or irrigation works.

(*b*) *At the regional level*

The Divisional Commissioner was made responsible for the supervision of the relief programmes within his Division, reporting regularly to the Government on how the relief programme was being implemented drawing attention to the difficulties faced by the implementing agencies and how these were being overcome. He was empowered to requisition trucks from Government departments within the division and direct how they should be used on relief work, he had authority to purchase tools required for scarcity relief works. Funds were placed at his disposal to enable *tagai* loans[4] to be distributed among farmers. Divisional Commissioners were required to hold fortnightly staff meetings to bring to the personal notice of all officers all important directives issued by the State Government.

In the case of functional departments such as the Buildings and Communications Department, the unity of command and departmental hierarchy were significantly affected by placing the Executive Engineers and Sub-Divisional Officers directly under the control of the Collector. The Superintending Engineers, the controlling officers in normal times, were entrusted mainly with the task of offering technical advice, ensuring the supply and maintenance of equipment and records, and seeing that departmental

[4]Tagai is a direct *Government* loan made to farmers in cash or in kind so that they can procure seed, fertiliser, pesticides, cattle fodder, etc.

instructions were carried out by executive engineers, sub-divisional officers and other staff. This was a significant change, as, in normal times, each technical department has its own hierarchy of officials from the State level down to the village, all of whose functions lie outside the supervisory jurisdiction of the Collector.

At the district level which has been the main theatre of relief operations, the Collector occupied the pivotal position. His supremacy was undisputed and he was clothed with all the powers necessary to match his responsibilities. The district level heads of departments were, for all practical purposes, placed under him. For those in doubt instructions from the Secretariat made very clear, time and again, that the Collector was in command. He had to prepare the scarcity relief plan for his area, allocate work among the different agencies involved in plan-implementation, secure funds, manpower and equipment, ensure prompt payments to the emergency relief labour force, supervise and control the entire operation personally and through the revenue hierarchy. Besides the onus was on him to remove any bottlenecks which delayed relief undertakings, indeed he was the Implementer-in-Chief for the whole range of functions listed in the Scarcity Manual. The responsibility for the successful conduct of relief operations was his, and to the state government, now represented largely by the Revenue Department, the point of reference at the district level was the collector.

The collector had at his disposal all the agencies involved in implementing the emergency relief plan – these included the Buildings and Communications Department, Irrigation and Power Department, Agriculture and Co-operatives Department (Soil Conservation), Forests Department and the entire three-tier panchayati raj organisation headed by the *Zilla Parishad*[5], which, in normal times, is a very powerful autonomous organisation in Maharashtra functioning much like a regional legislature with representatives directly elected from local constituencies. All this was in addition to the normal revenue hierarchy which is always available to the collector. Thus, with the integration of the district level establishment of Government and the whole panchayati raj set-up, a huge and complex administrative machine was created which the collector was required to operate.

The normal organisational performance structure had to be altered by making changes in the resources structure. In other words, all kinds of resources – funds, personnel and material – had to be increased to enhance the capacity of the organisation to meet the challenge of the emergency. There was a clear directive to the collectors that relief works should not suffer through lack of funds. Similarly, need for more staff was met in a number of ways. Firstly, the collectors were asked to deploy their own staff on relief works. Secondly, certain sub-decisions of the technical departments[6] were transferred to the collector's for engagement in these operations. Thirdly, in consultation with the heads of departments, the collectors

[5]In the State of Maharashtra the top tier in the local self-government system, the *Zilla Parishad*, has rather more active functions to perform than in many other States where the middle tier, the Panchayat Samiti is the chief executive agency at local level. (Ed.).

[6]By Buildings and Communication, Irrigation and Power.

were empowered to requisition such staff from other departments as overseers, block development officers, extension officers, muster clerks and so on. Fourthly, the collectors were authorised to recruit, for a one year period, in consultation with the executive agencies, retired technical personnel who might be able to lend a valuable and experienced hand (eg. engineers, overseers and carpenters) and they could also create new temporary posts in certain categories. There were also those technically-qualified people who in some instances volunteered their services in an honorary capacity. Lastly, resort was had to the delegation of powers to lower functionaries and this had the effect of augmenting manpower. For instance, sub-overseers took over from overseers the latter's normal task of checking the work out-put of the daily labour force.

Similarly, steps were taken to increase the supply of much-needed tools and mechanical equipment, trucks and other transport, foodgrains and cattle fodder, domestic water supplies and medicines. The Procurement of items such as tools and fodder was expedited by outright purchases, and by the manipulation of existing resources within other departments and organisations. For instance, the Buildings and Communications Department issued instructions to its Engineers to make road rollers available to the *Zilla Parishads* on demand. For trucks, jeeps and other vehicles, the collectors were authorised to requisition these from Government departments and even from private individuals, factories and co-operatives. Help from the Army authorities, private industry, municipal organisations, and voluntary and philanthropic institutions took a great deal of strain off the government agencies.

A large number of non-official organisations[7], including private firms and academic bodies, came forward to offer help in the relief operations. They were able to render assistance in a number of ways, eg. in the distribution of food supplies, by providing medical assistance, by supplying equipment such as tractors, tankers, pumps and high-speed drilling rigs. Some placed technical staff at the disposal of government while a few others helped in actual survey work and carried out a number of jobs including work on community wells.

In dealing with the Emergency situation an important part was played by the several special committees which were set up. At the State level besides the Secretaries' Committee already mentioned, there were *ad hoc* meetings at which the Chief Minister would consult members of the Legislature, the Revenue Secretary had similar *ad hoc* meetings with members of the agencies carrying out relief operations so as to co-ordinate their efforts. The District Relief Committee with the Collector as Chairman consisted of all the district heads of department, the chairman of subject committees and the Chief Executive Officer of the *Zilla Parishad*, all the Union and State Parliament members for the district together with representatives of all the local political parties. At the *Taluka*[8] level, a similar Committee was set up under the sub-

[7] In Poona District these included, *inter alia*, OXFAM, the WADIA Trust, B.J. Medical College, Poona Women's Council, Phillips India Ltd., ESSO and the Maharashtra Executors and Trustees Co. An important local government body outside the actual scarcity area, which also gave help, was the Greater Bombay Municipal Council.

[8] A Taluka is a revenue unit below that of a sub-division but generally larger than that of a block or a *Panchayat Samiti*.

divisional officer's Chairmanship and with members including all the leading officials and non-officials at that level. These committees were mainly to advise the Government organisation on relief matters, to stimulate private charity and to provide general supervision over relief works and over the distribution of gratuitous relief.

A committee with the collector (chairman) and district heads of departments executing different relief schemes was constituted to facilitate inter-agency co-ordination and consultation.

A chain of committees was brought into being under a newly-created Directorate of Medical Relief. The district level committee consisted of the Collector, Chief Executive Officer of the *Zilla Parishad*, the Civil Surgeon, the District Health Officer and Dean of the Medical College concerned in the area. The purpose of these committees was to organise and co-ordinate the various measures of medical relief taken by governmental and private agencies. To keep watch on relief operations and to detect defects and corrupt practices, a three-man vigilance committee was constituted in each sub-division, composed of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and one nominated non-official. One important function of this committee has been to keep a close watch on how fair prices rules have been working in the shops.

Among the wide variety of relief undertakings carried out by the *Zilla Parishad* in association with the lower tiers of the *Panchayati Raj* system, were: road works; irrigation, village pond and community-wells projects; the operation of metal breaking centres, schemes for percolation tanks and for desilting tanks. The larger programmes were the responsibility of the construction and irrigation wings of the *Parishad*. On the ground the Block Development Officer (BDO) along with the Extension Officers, provided general supervision while the BDO was given the duty of drawing funds and disbursing payments due to scarcity relief labour. Even the tiny village panchayats had their share of responsibilities such as the maintenance of tools and equipment, feeding the sick and the aged, looking after the drinking water supply and undertaking the construction of community wells.

The main features of the relief operation can be summed up as (i) intimate Secretariat-field interactions, (ii) the replacement of departmental individualism by a corporate approach to field problems, (iii) the integration of State departmental establishments under the stewardship of the collector at the district level, (iv) the merger of State administration and the elective panchayati raj system, and (v) close co-operation between different kinds of private, public and semi-public organisations. From the point of view of the traditional bureaucratic model[9], the emergency situation had certain interesting sidelights, as the state bureaucracy had to shed much of its normal inflexibility, red tape and dilatory procedures in order to meet the challenge of scarcity. Hierarchical rigidity was modified, and while the division of labour and the scheduling of tasks were adhered to, yet there was more intra-departmental interactions and more across-the-boundary communication between organisations. Rules were not thrown overboard; these were sedulously issued and scrupulously followed. But the speed with which

[9]The Weber Model.

Rules and Instructions multiplied so as to meet the constantly changing emergency situation, brought through the rapid changes introduced, a needed flexibility to operational procedures, so often lacking in normal times. Administration during scarcity work exhibited considerable flexibility and the Weberian characteristics were thus greatly modified. Instead of a wholly rational, rule-oriented, impersonal approach, assured by strict standardisation of work procedures, in a field situation characterised by large-scale disaster, bureaucracy was not a faceless and anonymous machine. From all accounts, it appears that there was a sense of personal involvement in alleviating misery which had almost transformed scarcity administration into welfare administration.

Looking ahead

There is no doubt that it is primarily because of large-scale government intervention that a disaster of the first magnitude was averted in Maharashtra. Currently, the Government of India is considering long-term plans for the eradication of scarcity conditions in those parts of the country where they have presented a recurrent problem. The Maharashtra Government has just completed a survey of the scarcity-stricken areas from the point of view of their economic potential and future development[10]. Alongside economic planning, the problem of administrative organisation is also receiving attention.

The way scarcity relief operations were handled has important lessons for the general conduct of public administration, especially development administration. Despite the urgent need for a dynamic post-independence government machine, the form and style of administration in India has been changed very little. Both at the Secretariat and the district levels, individual departments have tended to become insular with the result that there are as many governments as there are departments. Departmental isolationism has played havoc with field level administration where the need for evolving an efficient system for an interdependent package of services is most acute. Administration at the ground level is patently discordant. Apparently, all the departments are trying to reach out to the villages; yet, in the absence of a clear and coherent spatial development objective and due to a lack of harmonious co-ordinated operations, the results of these departmental activities amount to little more than scattered and unrelated rag and bobtail achievements.

It seems that it needs a series of emergencies to lend purpose and harmony to development administration. An emergency operation usually takes place within an altered behavioural frame instilling in everybody a heightened sense of anxiety to perform allotted tasks quickly and properly. Essentially, it involves manipulation of the administrative mind. If development administration has to be salvaged from ritualistic formalism and specifically orientated to economic and social objectives, then it is high time that administration at all levels is converted into "phased emergencies". In this respect the relief administration in Maharashtra has a moral to preach to the bureaucracy and the politicians alike.

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[10] *Report of the Fact Finding Committee for Survey of Scarcity in Maharashtra*, Vol. I, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1973.

Quarterly Notes

CENTO – *Recent Developments of the System of Social Accounts*

At the Final Session of the Symposium held in Karachi from 2-7 March 1974, the delegations agreed that the meeting had revealed the undoubted usefulness to Cento Member States of the System of National Accounts* (SNA) in developing their respective accounts systems. More specifically, the symposium had shown that further specialist training for regional statistical authorities and technicians in adopting their national data to SNA was essential. Among the recommendations the symposium agreed to make to the Central Treaty Organisation were the following:

> That a symposium on population and demographic statistics be held in April 1975; that three successive annual CENTO workshops on the application of SNA be held in the Region whereby experts could work with practical problems under the guidance of specialised authorities; that a team of non-regional experts conduct training courses in the respective regional countries on the application of SNA; that regional experts and technicians be enabled to visit non-regional as well as regional countries, for the purpose of examining and studying successful applications of SNA; and that CENTO look favourably on proposals by regional governments for the development of highly-specialised experts in SNA through formal training courses of from 1 to 2 years in one of the non-regional countries.

*A Methodological device for providing a constant statistical picture of the economic performance and activity of a nation or community during a specific period of time. This measurement is in terms of aggregates of actual and imputed economic transactions and bookings.

BRITAIN – *Local Government Training*

Dr. G. W. A. Bush of the University of Auckland recently spent a sabbatical year studying the English local government system. The following observation comes from an article written after his return home.

"One notable feature of local government training in England is the degree of university participation. Pre-eminent is the thriving Institute of Local Government Studies attached to the University of Birmingham. With an academic staff of nearly forty, it provides a variety of courses at a high level tailored to the needs of executive local body officers. Additionally it teaches towards post-graduate degrees and diplomas in local government, runs development administration courses for overseas (mainly third-world) students and undertakes an intensive programme of research, much of which has at least a spill-over value for training."

Source: New Zealand Local Government, Vol X, No. 5

UNITED NATIONS – *The Making of a Delegate*

No 2 of Vol 6 of *Unitar News* is a revised and enlarged edition of a previous special issue, which was devoted to the complexities facing new delegates to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Articles on subjects such as The United Nations System, and Steps in Preparation, Discussion and Adoption of a Resolution, are written in clear and informative language, while several useful charts and illustrations help further to clarify the United Nations set-up for the benefit of the ordinary reader as much as for the newly-appointed delegate for whom it is primarily intended.

Source: *Unitar News*

PAPUA NEW GUINEA – *Local Government Powers*

A legal opinion on the rule-making powers of local Councils created under the Papua New Guinea Local Government Ordinance included the following comment:

Inconsistency

The general powers of Councils are specifically made subject to the Ordinance and any other law in force in the Territory or part of the Territory or a part of the Territory, and in the case of the rule-making power contained in Section 44 rules must not be inconsistent with this or any other Ordinance, Act or subordinate enactment in force in the Territory or a part of the Territory. This clearly means that a rule, otherwise within Council powers cannot make valid what some other legislation makes invalid – a rule cannot, for example, exempt vehicles from the Motor Traffic Ordinance or animals from the Animal Trespass Ordinance. Other cases, however, are to a greater or a lesser degree matters of opinion (even if expert or professional opinion). The general rule has been expressed to be that a law is inconsistent with another law if the two cannot be complied with at the same time: for example, one can register a motor vehicle both with the Superintendent of Motor Traffic and with the Council, so to *that extent* a Council rule requiring the registration of some or all vehicles might not be inconsistent with the Motor Traffic Ordinance. However, it may be in some cases that the central legislature has intended to cover the whole field of a subject and either expressly (most rare) or implicitly "covered the whole field" if this is so (and it has been a matter often raised under the Australian Constitution), there is obviously an implicit inconsistency, but the initial decision as to whether or not a particular piece of legislation has "covered the field" is by no means obvious.

Source: The Local Government Bulletin of Papua New Guinea, Volume 3 No. 1

CANADA – *African Studies*

The Annual Convention of the Canadian Association of African Studies will take place at the Empress Hotel, Victoria, B.C., February 18-21, 1976. The general theme of the conference will be "The Canadian Involvement in Africa". Further particulars are available from Dr. Edgar S. Efrat, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2.

Book Reviews

The Politics of Foreign Aid, by JOHN WHITE; *Bodley Head*, 1974; index; pp. 316; £4.50.

There is a 'skit' on linguistic philosophers in which Bertrand Russell bursts into G. E. Moore's room to ask the burning question: "Moore, have you any apples?" "No", he replies. "Moore, have you some apples?" "No", he insists. "Moore, have you apples?" "Yes", he concedes, satisfied at last with the formulation. If John White's latest work recalls the inscrutable perversity of that conversation, it is because the question of aid is now as vexed as Moore made the question of apples.

For this unhappy state of affairs, the author blames the heady rhetoric of rival aid agencies and the 'punditry' of competing economists. He criticises the bilateral institutions for similar errors but it is the international ones that bear the brunt. Their 'holier than thou' claims it appears have made the Vatican's pretension to infallibility look pale; "they generalise about developing countries as a class, obscuring particular problems requiring particular solutions"; they pursue the illusion that "there is some single process called 'development', that any departure from their recommendations for economic growth constitutes a dilution of the developmental character of aid".

From divine discontent of this kind, White sets out to clarify the semantic confusions of the aid vocabulary and brings its doctrinal illusions down to earth in "operational" and therefore, political and institutional realities. For this purpose he reviews in bold strokes the phases of the aid effort since the Marshall Plan. Of the Development Decade of the 'Sixties, he concludes paradoxically that "The global effort was premature . . . The reason why the pace of evolution . . . was so slow was that the principal agents of change could not see the trees for the wood". Those who launched that Crusade might well reply that, but for the wood, however illusory it proved, there might not have been a tree to be seen! Another chapter summarises existing aid theories. The author characteristically is sceptical of all of them, whether they argue that aid is a boon or a curse to developing countries. What is more he despairs of study ever discovering its effects, since the question of what would have happened with or without it remains for ever, in his view a hypothetical question. On the other hand he is consoled with a sense of moral commitment to aid and comforted with the thought that inputs of resources managed less ambitiously and more particularly cannot but increase beneficial outputs of some sort.

The argument, though full of subtle twists and sharp perceptions of the aid jungle sometimes loses proportion in running after paradox. Nevertheless, nothing could be more convincing than the analysis of recipient aid strategy given in the third chapter. When a recipient obtains aid by seeming to agree to the donor's purpose and uses it for his own different needs, the paradox is real enough. Neither party is likely to achieve its aim. "With these

strategies of presentation and appropriation", the author warns gloomily, "the one who wins is the one who is most skilful in breaking the rules – which makes the establishment of a durable working relationship between donor and recipient even harder than it already is".

It is in the concluding chapter on 'Aid as Political Action' that the taste for paradox seems to lure the thesis away from reality. John White's wide-ranging survey leads to several convictions, among them that the grandiose illusions spread by multi-lateral agencies have led to serious waste in the allocation and use of aid. "Words became a substitute for purpose". However the rhetoric is re-furbished it will not make donors significantly less selfish or more generous. What can be done is to leave the rhetoric to orators and improve the decision-making and organisation of the national and international aid technocracy. A number of reforms are recommended for this purpose, and it is argued from an impressionist analysis of British opinion recently, that the constraints which 'lobbies' impose on the technical refinement of aid policies are to a large extent illusory. The message seems to be – stop shouting and let the aid-administrators get on with their job. This is a surprising nostrum considering the criticism previously levelled at ODM and at aid technocracy in general, indeed it is a curiously bureaucratic conclusion to a study of the politics of aid. One is left wondering how long this divorce of aid allocation policy from the politics of aid-provision could last, if any government were foolhardy enough to attempt it.

Nevertheless, this book is not only the best introduction to the theory and practice of aid in general, but also a brilliantly provocative, if slightly perverse critique of aid policy and organisation. The lack of case studies of the use and effect of aid in particular countries compels John White to rely himself on the generalisations and speculations which he criticises in others. Until we know more about this, it will be impossible to be sure whether we have any or some aid, and above all "development" aid. White and G. E. Moore have much in common.

RONALD ROBINSON

Corporations and Society, by M. G. SMITH (ed.); *Duckworth, London,* 1974; pp. 379, bibl.; £7.95 (U.K. only).

Corporations and Society brings together a collection of nine essays that reflect a long-standing theoretical concern that has informed much of the major writings of Professor M. G. Smith. For nearly two decades he has persistently and progressively developed the idea that "corporation theory" provides a more objective analytic framework for the study of social units as concrete empirical structures than does "system-model theory" advanced in modern sociology and political science. The intellectual capital for M. G. Smith's conceptual framework has been drawn from two of the leading nineteenth-century social theorists, Sir Henry Maine and Max Weber, who introduced the notion of the corporateness of social groups, and other ideas concerning collective behaviour, in social evolutionary perspectives. Although Smith has elaborated considerably the ideas of Maine and Weber and tested his new formulations against empirical data unavailable a century ago, the contours of the sociological framework of his corporation theory

have not been misshapened beyond recognition. "Corporations", he argues, "provide the major institutional frameworks and agencies of collective regulation" in societies diverse in forms of social organisation and in processes of integration of component structures.

Of the six previously published essays that cover topics of law, comparative politics, and plural societies, the first selection is the classic "On Segmentary Lineage Systems", published in 1954. It is appropriate that this should be the lead essay, setting the theoretical tone for the collection, for here Smith first developed the framework of corporation theory for the analysis of micro-sociological models. Differences in problem and scale are reflected in the three hitherto unpublished essays included on political change, complex societies, and race and stratification in the Caribbean. Taken as a whole, the threads linking together this set of essays indicate the range of Professor Smith's empirical and theoretical interests, on the one hand, and the extent to which structural and comparative analysis are possible within the conceptual framework of corporation and society, on the other. With some of these threads he has already woven major theses; *Government in Zazzau*, *Stratification in Grenada*, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*, among others. This very useful integrated collection of Professor Smith's most important essays on the idea of the corporation has much wider sociological relevance than for the study of societies in the Caribbean and the Muslim states of the Central Sudan.

WILLIAM A. SHACK

Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania, by ROBERT MARTIN; *Nairobi: Oxford University Press*, 1974; pp. 234; Shs. 20/- (East Africa).

Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region, by JAMES R. FINUCANE; *Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies*, 1974; pp. 192.

Writing from a socialist rather than a liberal-democratic viewpoint, Robert Martin analyses the contradiction between the need to exercise state power in the interests of national development and the necessity of promoting the dignity and freedom of every person. "Basically", he comments, "this book is an attempt to raise questions about an issue which remains the 'Achilles heel' of socialism – the exercise of state power within a society attempting to build socialism. How should state power be exercised, through what institutions, according to what standards? What controls should be placed on its exercise, what limits?" The issues raised are important, but despite some worthwhile comment, the treatment of them is inadequate.

The author professes to advance the study of public law in Africa through the use of "a theoretical approach" that is "ideologically or culturally relevant" to Tanzanian goals and priorities. In fact, his theorising is culled uncritically from the "development of underdevelopment" school and is entirely encased in lengthy quotations and bibliographical references. I for one could not find an original conception in this work. Martin provides virtually no discussion of the nature of Tanzanian society, of the goals and priorities pursued, or how and by whom they are determined. He tells us that the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) has had some success

in controlling the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', but does not assess TANU's mobilisation capacity. Yet he maintains that the key to the creation of the new state machine which will replace the inappropriate, inherited machine is the transfer of power from the bureaucracy to the masses; that President Nyerere prefers mobilisation to "coercion" as the operational approach to development (Martin seems to think that coercion and mobilisation are alternatives – Nyerere, as recent events show, is under no such illusion); that the people must be more and more involved in the construction and defence of what is now their own state; and that the courts and the law need to be "changed from tools of the bourgeoisie into instruments of the masses" (indeed!). A major weakness of the book is that the theoretical concerns with which it begins are only marginally related to the detailed and often useful treatment of the executive, criminal procedure, and the permanent commission of enquiry in Chapters 3-5. The book would have benefited from up-dating and badly needs a concluding chapter to give cohesion to the whole.

Contrary to the teaching of Mao Tse-tung (whom he quotes approvingly elsewhere), Martin assures us that "in the socialist state, as the political power and participation of the people increases and the organs of the state increasingly express the will of the people, the contradiction between the state and the individual disappears". Though he refers from time to time to the TANU Guidelines ('Mwongozo') of February 1971, he does not say whether popular involvement in decision-making has increased in any significant way. To a large extent this gap is filled by James Finucane in his valuable and well-documented study of *Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania*. Focusing on the Mwanza Region, the country's single largest unit of rural inhabitants, Dr. Finucane concludes:

> "My findings, considered with other studies, indicate quite clearly that the participation of the general citizenry in the decision-making of the national political system had not notably increased nor changed in nature since the last decade of colonial rule, the ideological and rhetorical images arising from a fairly intense amount of intra-elite participation in discussions about what to do with the general citizenry notwithstanding."

Finucane shows that, in the absence of a strong party organisation, the bureaucratic approach to development has dominated in Tanzania – this was also the conclusion reached by Paul Collins in his study of the Rural Development Fund. He argues the decentralisation measures launched by President Nyerere in January 1972, amount essentially to an exercise in the deconcentration of administrative authority to field officials, and are likely to result, at best, in only an indirect increase in popular involvement.

"A commitment to socialism", President Nyerere has said, "is half the battle in building socialism". Judges are expected to share this commitment and to show by their actions that "the independence of the judiciary does not mean the isolation of the judiciary from the life of the nation". (*Freedom and Development* (1973), pp. 151 and 261). Tanzania's civil servants must share this commitment, too. If they have sometimes been biased in favour of the progressive farmer, the great majority of them have, as Finucane points out, faithfully tried to implement the socialist and self-reliance policies set by the

leadership. It is, therefore, unfair to blame the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' alone for failing to implement these policies. We should also ask whether these policies have been sufficiently rooted in the realities of village life in Tanzania and explain why, as in the present decentralisation exercise, the leadership has had to rely on the state apparatus rather than the party. Dr. Finucane's study not only shows why the bureaucracy has continued to play such a key role in rural development in the Mwanza Region, but also sheds light on the broader issues raised by Mr. Martin in the first chapter of his book. Though Finucane, like Martin, tends to be deferential to his preferred authorities, his book is well-grounded in the factual realities of his subject and does develop an original perspective.

W. TORDOFF

African Societies, by LUCY MAIR; *Cambridge University Press,* 1974; pp. 251; £4.

Contemporary practitioners of the science – or art – of social anthropology are by no means unanimous as to what exactly their subject is about, but most of them would agree that it is not (or not only) about what used to be called "primitive peoples". Nevertheless, the subject grew up in the context of the field study of small-scale, mostly preliterate communities, and a good many anthropologists are still mostly concerned with the few of these that are left. In any case, no one can claim an adequate understanding of either modern anthropology or the "third world" unless he knows something about the immense variety of traditional cultures, most of which are now undergoing rapid and radical change.

Lucy Mair's latest book provides this vital background knowledge, in reasonably assimilable form, for a selection of the traditional societies of Africa south of the Sahara. The work is intended for first or second year students of ethnography, but it will have a wider appeal. She provides concise descriptions of some 19 African cultures, ranging from the food-gathering pygmies of the Ituri Forest to the highly-developed and complex state organisations of Benin in West Africa, and the interlacustrine kingdom in the east. Her accounts are based on the best and most recent professional field studies; in fact of the 50 or so sources listed in her bibliography no less than three-quarters have been published since 1960.

But the book is not just descriptive ethnography. Professor Mair's approach is the so-called "structural-functional" one which looks for the causes and consequences of things as well as for their meanings, and she uses her material to illustrate certain theoretical issues which have in recent years been of concern to anthropologists. Her initial emphasis is ecological; dependent though hunters and gatherers, herdsmen and farmers are on their physical environment, there is no room, she argues, for a strict environmental determinism. In later chapters the ubiquitous anthropological themes of "kinship", political organisation and ritual are aptly exemplified, and several current debates are touched upon. How basic is the idea of economic self-interest in pre-industrial societies, for example, and can the traditional Uganda states, and others like them, be appropriately characterised as "feudal"? Again, are traditional African religions to be best understood as types of explanatory

"theory" or rather in terms of expressive symbolism – or, perhaps, as containing elements of both?

These and other important questions underpin Professor Mair's clearly written and informative book, and give it a systematic unity rare in such works. A minor criticism is that the non-professional reader who would like to follow up some of the current issues and controversies mentioned might have been given rather more indication of where to do so: no doubt students will obtain such information from their instructors.

JOHN BEATTIE

Agrarian Reform and Agrarian Reformism, Edited by DAVID LEHMANN; *Faber & Faber* (1974); pp. 320; £1.80.

This is not an easy book to read, but then Land Reform is not an easy subject. That message at least somes across loud and clear.

The book is a collection of case studies on land reform in Peru, Chile, China and India. It opens with a short introduction by the editor, and ends with an essay by Michael Lipton "Towards a Policy of Land Reform", one of the best pieces in the book.

Collections of essays are never easy to digest because each has been written independently and there is seldom much cohesion. The role of Editor is vital and David Lehmann's Introduction is excellent: it introduces the main theme of the book that although everyone seems to have a clear idea in their mind of what land reform is meant to achieve (a more equitable distribution of land) in practice it is extremely difficult, and there are many examples of well-meaning schemes that have either failed completely or have even created a situation as bad as, if not worse than, prevailed before.

Good though it is, the Introduction does not adequately prepare the reader for the labyrinthine way that lies ahead. If the Editor had been able to discipline his contributors it might not have been too bad, but he could not, or did not. So the reader is then plunged immediately into a detailed and confused description of the political situation in Peru without being given any background material on the existing land tenure system against which the problem can be gauged. Indeed the whole of Zaldivar's essay is highly political, and although one may accept that the subject is inherently political in nature, one's patience is sorely tried when people are not only divided into upper, middle and lower bourgeois, but into national, agrarian, urban, grande, traditional, liberal, and even Latin American, bourgeois as well! This is a pity because the author has an important message, i.e. that agrarian reform in Peru has actually tended to favour the industrial sector more than the agrarian, and the merchants more than the peasants.

The other essays also show how often the results of agrarian reform fall short of expectations. David Lehmann shows how time and again reform schemes in Chile have failed due to political conflicts, the absence of any commonly accepted objectives, and above all the determination of the peasants to pursue their own interests as they see them, and giving way to what Lehmann evidently regards as a fatal weakness: "responding to market incentives".

Shillinglaw's main objective in his essay on China's land reform programme of 1947-50 seems to be to illustrate the description he gives of China's land reform as a "complex calculus of costs and opportunities". Complex it certainly is, especially if you happen to have forgotten the more intricate details of Chinese domestic politics of the late 1940's.

The last section, on India, again takes up the recurrent theme – so much hoped for, so little achieved. The power of the landlords and rich farmers to survive under pressure, and even to turn events to their own advantage, is vividly demonstrated.

Michael Lipton's concluding essay is a model of lucid analysis which might with profit have been placed nearer the beginning of the book as a *vade mecum* to the case studies themselves. After all the cynicism and disillusion of the case studies, Lipton's conclusions are refreshingly positive and even optimistic. Provided it is planned with care and executed with skill, radically distributive land reform does work. Indeed it is really the only effective way of dealing with the wrongs and inefficiences of maldistribution of land. Our faith is restored.

BASIL E. CRACKNELL

Development Administration In Rural Government for Agricultural Production, by M. A. MUTTALIB; *Osmania University, Hyderabad,* 1973; Rs 30.

This is a very detailed study of the relationship between the parallel administrative systems of government officials and of elected (Panchayati Raj) councils in the administration and servicing of agricultural development, at District level and below, in India. The study was launched in 1967, and most of the field work appears to have been done in 1969/70.

The early chapters give an extremely detailed description of the structures and functions of the two systems in two contrasting Districts (Nizamabad in Andhra Pradesh and Aurangabad in Maharashtra). As such, this description provides a full primer for any student of this part of Indian agricultural administration. Later Chapters try to assess the effectiveness of this mixed system, and also to give an 'opinion survey' of what officials and non-officials feel to be its advantages and defects. The chief contrast between the two Districts is that in Maharashtra the main control comes from the elected Zilla Parishad, employing its own Chief Executive Officer, of Collector rank, whereas in Andhra Pradesh, the main drive comes from the Collector, as chief development executive in the District.

Concluding Chapters try to assess, in more general terms, the arguments in favour, or against, this mixed system in its two sub-varieties.

This is a fairly long book – 247 closely-printed pages, plus appendices, etc. It will not add significantly new thoughts to readers already familiar with the issues, complex and difficult as they are. Perhaps its main impact is to underline the sad fact that the actual services to farmers, despite all the effort, barely manage to emerge from the tangle of rules and hierarchies in a form which is timely and efficient, least of all to the smaller farmers; and this is true both of official and non-official lines of control and execution.

The two villains of the piece are the pervasive influence of factional politics, and the rigidities which are entailed by the efforts of the central and State governments to retain financial, administrative and disciplinary control of a huge bureaucracy. The former probably cannot be much altered. But the latter could be much improved by courageous devolution and by eliciting and supporting far more initiative from the farmers themselves, and accepting the inevitable untidiness which is the price of greater freedom.

GUY HUNTER

The Planner in Society: The Changing Role of a Profession, by DAVID EVERSLEY; *Faber & Faber, London,* 1973; pp. 360; £4.75.

I have found this book enormously stimulating and enjoyable reading, the main reason being that the author became involved in planning at a relatively late stage in life, thus enabling him to view the profession from a number of new angles. He was appointed Chief Strategic Planner to the Greater London Council in 1969, after already having established himself as a distinguished academic in the social sciences. Three years with the Greater London Council enabled him to gain a clear understanding of what planning is about; but not having been cast in the conventional mould of a professionally-trained planner, his approach to the subject is refreshingly different from the great spate of recent literature on the subject of planning.

The usefulness of the book is strongly related to the author's historical bent and his perception of sociological and political phenomena. He has cast his net wide and has taken as his terms of reference a spectrum of considerations ranging from the planners' role in contemporary history to detailed aspects of the educational syllabus for urban and regional planning.

The book is in four parts. In part one, Eversley attempts to define planning and he goes on to demonstrate how significant the planner's contribution has been in relation to the allocation of scarce resources. He provides a great deal of interesting statistical information which he uses very convincingly to demonstrate that the planner is in a strong position to contribute to the redistribution of economic wealth in contemporary society. Although he shows that planners are sometimes insensitive to their responsibilities in this regard, he also gives them credit for having tried to come to terms with the demands placed upon them by society. In this connection he has identified several strands of philosophical thought which underpin much of the planner's approach to his work, and which has contributed greatly to present professional ideology.

Part two provides an account of how modern planning has evolved in Britain during the period since World War II in response to social and economic conditions. Here he draws heavily on his experience in the Greater London Council. He also discusses, and attempts to evaluate, a number of current methodologies and techniques. The approach is rather emotive and some of his conclusions may be questioned, but his sense of humour and racy style makes it all very entertaining. He even manages to have a go at the recent fashion for corporate management, and his contribution to the considerable lore on the Whitehall supremacy in all aspects of public decision-making will be of interest to anyone in the field of public administration.

Part three is entitled "The Planner and the Planned" and appropriately deals with the trend towards greater public participation in the planning process. He advances some interesting ideas on why planning has become a monster profession in the public eye, in his opinion the most important being the rather authoritarian procedures adopted in fields like urban renewal, since World War II. He shows that, due to a greater awareness of political processes the planner is responding to this rather unfortunate image by taking more account of public opinion and the views of pressure groups; but he also warns against the traditional propensity of professional people to feel duty bound to act as arbiters of taste.

Part four is a rather lengthy attempt of over one hundred pages, where Eversley tries to draw together all the material in the previous parts for the purpose of providing some insight into the future prospects of planning. He deals with planning education, among other things, and here a degree of illogicality creeps in. At the beginning Eversley defined the planner as a person who is concerned in general terms with the allocation of resources; a definition which is so wide that it would include the great majority of administrators, both in the public and private sectors. When it comes to discussing education he chooses a professional group, numbering only a few thousand. The profession he has chosen are members of the Royal Town Planning Institute, and he looks at the syllabus of the courses recognised by the Institute for their professional examinations. The town planning profession being concerned only with limited aspects of resource allocation, it is only too obvious that he would find their educational provisions inadequate for the training of the kind of person defined at the beginning of the book. This is rather surprising for a man who attempts to expose the inconsistencies of planning. In order to follow through the logic of his definition of the planner, he would have been better served by making an analysis of the general educational provisions for a wide range of disciplines which provide recruits for jobs concerned with resource allocation. If he had done this I suspect he would have arrived at different conclusions, certainly in so far that I expect he would have been able to identify the disadvantages of educational compartmentalisation and to show the value of developing an awareness of the relationships among disciplines, which is the hallmark of town planning education.

The book is not intended for any particular audience. I, personally, found it very helpful in providing a general insight into the role of a professional person in society, and I feel sure that it will be equally useful to readers who are on the other side of the fence. The book is based on British material; but this does not impose limitations on its value to an overseas reader. Eversley has provided a new and interesting framework for viewing the planner in society and I am confident that once understood this framework will be valid in any national context.

JAN M. FLADMARK

Taxing a Peasant Society: the example of graduated taxes in East Africa, by KENNETH DAVEY; *Charles Knight & Co.*, 1974; pp. 226; £2.50.

The subject of Mr. Davey's book is the graduated tax in Uganda, which he describes as "a crude form of income tax levied . . . upon the entire popu-

lation of able-bodied adult males and some women by the district administrations and urban authorities where they reside". The purpose of the book is twofold: (a) to test the validity of claims made by writers such as Ursula Hicks in the early 1960s concerning the advantages of mass direct taxation by local government bodies in Africa and the particular virtues of the Ugandan system; and (b) to consider, on the basis of the Ugandan evidence (and some additional information from Kenya, Tanzania and Northern Nigeria), what conditions might be necessary for such a taxation system to operate successfully in other developing countries as a means of promoting "development from below".

Drawing on a mass of official material as well as his own substantial experience as an administrator in Uganda, the author has produced a detailed commentary on the actual performance of the Ugandan graduated tax system from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. In the course of this he has many interesting and important points to make in relation to both his main themes, especially the first.

Mr. Davey's enthusiasm for the Ugandan tax system is somewhat more qualified than that of the earlier commentators. No doubt this is partly because he has been able to examine its operation more minutely, but it is also because the historical perspective has changed: their studies were made before Uganda's independence and it was immediately afterwards that the local government machinery got into difficulties through being overloaded with responsibilities, with the result that it had to be rescued by intervention from the centre.

After arguing briefly the need for taxation as a source of finance for development and comparing direct taxation favourably with indirect taxation in terms of its potential for greater equity and incentive, the author concentrates on the difficulties of assessing, collecting and administering a direct tax in conditions where most people are employed in agriculture (much of it outside the cash economy), less than 4 per cent of the population are in wage and salaried employment, and standards of literacy and administrative competence are low.

As far as assessment and collection are concerned, Davey accepts that, if anyone is to do it, it should be local personnel, in view of their local knowledge; and, on balance, despite all its present imperfections (the impossibility of truly accurate and equitable assessment of income in rural areas and the problems of nepotism, political pressure and high administrative costs) he concludes that the graduated tax remains "a sound base for development of direct taxation as incomes and administrative capacity grow". However, he is much more sceptical whether it is necessarily desirable that local authorities should in all cases be given a high degree of autonomy in raising or spending tax revenues. One of his arguments against decentralisation for decentralisation's sake, which tends to be generally true, is that where there are significant differences in regional wealth, a high degree of financial self-reliance will be incompatible with an equitable incidence of taxation. But his main argument against it is based simply on the level of administrative competence of local authorities in particular cases: where this is such

as to encourage "stagnation from below", as he judges was true in Uganda in the mid-1960s, substantial support from the centre becomes a necessity.

The final chapter of the book presents some specific recommendations for making the incidence of the graduated tax more progressive and removing anomalies between the criteria for assessing the graduated tax and the conventional income tax (originally reserved for Europeans and Asians). For those with a particular interest in Ugandan affairs the book is full of valuable "grassroots" insights, though it seems unlikely that much of its message will be heeded by the present regime. It is also valuable in a wider context, although the significant factors which have helped the graduated tax system to succeed – or at least survive – in Uganda (and might therefore act as a guide to its likely fate elsewhere) are often only hinted at *en passant*. Apart from the obvious factor of administrative capacity and all that that implies, others would appear to be relatively high population density, national geographical compactness, relatively high rainfall and a more even distribution of national income than in most ldcs. The question whether acceptance of taxation is likely to be greater in hierarchical or acephalous societies is also examined, but the result is inconclusive.

In short, this is a very useful and well-written study on a subject which has been insufficiently researched, especially from the administrative point of view. My only criticism is that those who are not Uganda specialists may find that the wealth of illustrative detail sometimes interferes with the flow of the author's argument and dulls the impact of his conclusions. I hope that in his next book he will stand away from his material a bit more and develop his theory, of which the ingredients are here, more boldly.

A. F. BOTTRALL

Pre-Disaster Planning: The Role of International Aid for Pre-Disaster Planning in Developing Countries, by FREDERICK KRIMGOLD; *Avdelningen for Arkitektur, Kth Stockholm,* 1974; illustrated; 134 pp.

Anyone concerned with the effects of natural hazards and the distribution of relief aid will welcome this volume as a necessary contribution to the small but growing field of pre-disaster planning. The author focuses attention on the dearth of pre-disaster planning by examining the rehabilitation and permanent reconstruction that followed the earthquake at Gediz, Turkey in 1970, and emphasises the lack of disaster preparedness and the static emergency procedures of the international and national agencies. The major criticism that the author levels at relief organisation is that disaster relief has the lowest ratio of planning in any public activity. In fact, both the budgets for pre-disaster planning of the League of Red Cross Societies and UNDRO are less than 0.16 per cent of the relief aid distributed by the United States alone. Prevention, mitigation and warning of disaster are seen as essential parts of the emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes which follow the hazard occurrence. Experts in disaster research may find that some of the unsubstantiated but incisive generalisations cause confusion. Such confusion should encourage others to consider the implications of disaster relief *per se* and the connections between disaster relief aid and economic development.

The explanations offered in the text are simple but the value of the work is particularly enhanced by graphic representation of the argument. A selective bibliography appears which places undue emphasis on architectural material, but this is compensated by a brief review of current plan documents. Several printer's errors and some poor cartographic presentation do not enhance the text, but none of this detracts from the message that disaster relief must be seen not as a bandage but as a vaccination.

P. O'KEEFE

Book Notes

Aid and Self-Help, by ELIZABETH O'KELLY; *Charles Knight & Co., London;* illustrated, appendix, index; pp. 140; £3.00.

This well-produced small book by an experienced Community Development Officer, provides the general reader who is a newcomer to matters of overseas aid, with a useful stimulus to want to learn more. There is plenty of good commonsense, as when the author points out the waste involved in sending cotton blankets from Europe and the Americas into a disaster area in Bengal when India is a major producer of such blankets; the need to use local knowledge and local personnel; the major problem of supplying food – how a people's diet cannot be changed overnight; the advantages of evaporated milk over dried milk, etc. Useful attention is drawn to Intermediate technology. Colonial administrators were probably more conscious than most people how it was the woman in rural areas who bore the heat and burden of the day (enhanced very considerably when menfolk were away during World War 2). They would agree with Elizabeth O'Kelly (and not disagree as she infers) that women in developing countries are, by and large, "far harder working and more realistic in their approach than most of the men". As the author suggests the key to rural development in the Third World lies in gaining the confidence of the women and thence the participation of the whole family.

The book concludes with three Chapters based on the author's experiences in Bamenda, the lovely anglo-phone Highlands area of the Cameroon Republic, where adequate rainfall and reasonable soil promise a bright and disaster-free agricultural future.

Le Projet Cerealies en Tunisie: etudes aux niveaux national et local, by IRENE HAVRI; *UN Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva;* pp. 100.

The author reports on the study in which she sought to analyse the economic and social implications of the "Green Revolution", in particular upon some thirty peasant cultivators in one Tunisian village and the changes in their conditions of work and life which the "Green Revolution" brought about.

She found that the pattern of performance was irregular, that there was an urgent need for technological research best adapted to specific local conditions;

i. seed varieties (the mexican varieties introduced do not seem to have come up to expectations),
ii. the use of tractors and combine harvesters; – how far such capital intensive methods are really appropriate where employment-creation is needed, how far agricultural machinery may be damaging to light and friable soils, etc.
iii. irrigation, soil improvement and soil recuperation – particularly in the light of limited water resources, and the dangers of the area of more easily-cultivated lands being reduced.

The author concludes with the remark that the "Green Revolution" is the one instrument of the politics of development which utterly rejects the idea that a powerful agricultural system can by itself produce a new technology and new structures for resolving socio-economic inconsistencies which she found were facing Tunisian agriculturalists.

Annuaire International de la Fonction Publique, 1974-75; *Ed* GERARD TIMSIT; *Institut International d'Administration Publique, Paris;* pp. 377; Francs 60.

This Yearbook, produced in the Centre for Research and Documentation on Public Administration, heralds International Women's Year with articles on women in executive posts in the Public Service (un phénomène marginal!), Women and L'ENA (National School of Administration) and Women in the Public Service in Spain.

Women's: Rights: A Practical Guide, by ANNA COOTE and TESS GILL; *Penguin Books;* appendices and index; pp. 349; 60p.

"We live in a man-made society", the authors begin, "the authority which men exercise over women is a major source of oppression", they continue, and despite progress over the past century they reckon that women still have a lot of rights to fight for. This Guide is intended to help in that fight by providing facts about the laws, rules and regulations which affect women's rights in Britain. Forthrightly and clearly written, entertainingly illustrated, and lowly priced, this modern guide with its modern feminine approach should sell well in Britain and should evoke an interested readership in countries overseas.

The Debt Trap – The IMF and the Third World, by CHERYL PAYER; *Penguin Books;* appendices and index; pp. 251; 60p.

The IMF is the author's *bête noire,* she blames it for nearly all the ills of the Third World. Alas, like so many theorists she paints her picture to fit her own preconceived notions. Not famine nor feudalism, not man-made population explosion nor God-made natural disaster, not ignorance, poverty or disease, not the harsh *realpolitik* of man's management of his affairs, but the poor unfortunate IMF is apportioned a major share of blame for the destruction of democracies and the success of military coups.

Dr. Payer concludes that "some hunger pangs . . . are probably inevitable if mass starvation is to be prevented. But in the long run it is more realistic to withdraw from an exploitive system and suffer the dislocations of readjustment than it is to petition the exploiters for a degree of relief". From a comfortably secure Western vantage point such a cynical suggestion that they had best tighten their belts and suffer will make incongruous perhaps incredible reading for the starving peasants of Sahel and Bangladesh, of Ethiopia and India, should this little book ever come to their knowledge as they struggle to survive.

Libya, The Elusive Revolution, by RUTH FIRST; *Penguin Books;* bibliography and index; pp. 295; 70p.

Since the military coup in 1969, Libya has played an increasingly important, if somewhat unpredictable role in the Arab World. Colonel Gadafi, devoutly muslim leader of a newly oil-rich State, has exerted his influence far from the shores of Libya and yet very little is known about the Libyan situation, its background and its prospects. Ruth First has filled a very real need by writing this clear and lively study of the causes and consequences of the 1969 revolution, which is to be commended both to student and general reader alike.

Rich Against Poor – the reality of Aid, by C. R. HENSMAN; *Penguin Books,* 1975; index; pp. 293; 90p.

The author shows appreciation of the good work and valuable lobbying which national and international Voluntary Agencies, eg. Oxfam and the Red Cross, undertake on behalf of the needy in the Third World. There is favourable reference to Macnamara and to U Thant. As a whole, however, this small book seems to be based on hate towards developed and industrialised nations, polemically expressed without much regard for reasoned argument. So wide a field is covered historically, globally and subject-wise that one is inclined to question the arrogance of an author professing to be right so often about so much.

Rhodesia – White Racism and Imperial Response, by MARTIN LONEY; *Penguin African Library;* index; pp. 233; 70p.

The Postscript to this short political history of modern Rhodesia refers to the *coup d'etat* in Portugal which took place after the book was written. To most observers the coup has brought the reasonable assumption that Independent FRELIMO-controlled Mozambique will be a major nail in the coffin of Ian Smith's UDI; Martin Loney, however, writes "certainly until a new government is elected and the military forced to

withdraw . . . internal contradictions and external pressures make it difficult to predict Portugal's future attitude with any confidence". Writing this note on the day it is announced that the prison escapee MacIntosh has been handed back to rebel Rhodesia by the Police authorities of FRELIMO-controlled Mozambique, gives one cause to respect the author's judgment.

The Savage in Literature, by BRIAN V. STREET; *Routledge & Kegan Paul;* bibliography and index; pp. 207; £5.75.

The Nineteenth Century was an era of great explorations, and the self-assured Victorians had no doubt that theirs was a civilising role and the burden of ruling distant alien peoples an obligation that could not be avoided. Throughout history people have had very strange ideas about their fellow men in other lands. The exotic East, the dark continent, conjured up in the Victorian imagination a number of strange fantasies. These are exemplified in the popular writings of the day – eg. the Tarzan stories, John Buchan, A. E. W. Mason, R. M. Ballantyne, Rider Haggard, whose exceedingly readable yarns, as Brian Street points out, "tell us more about the Victorians than they do about the people they purport to describe". Now out-dated scientific theory and the limited experience of travellers were then taken as representing fairly "primitive" life as a whole.

The author examines the attitudes of these Victorian and early Twentieth-Century writers, with perception and aware that opinions we would now view as exceedingly silly were neither exceptional nor malicious when they were expressed in the context of available Victorian knowledge and beliefs.

This is a well-written, well-produced book which merits a wide general readership.

Building Regulations in EEC Countries; *United Nations New York;* pp. 168; $US 6.00.

This UN Report was prepared by the Deputy Director-General and a Civil Engineer, of the National Swedish Board of Urban Planning. The widely differing systems used in Europe is emphasised – almost the only common factor is that countries require that a building permit must be obtained before a building is constructed – usually to be obtained from the local building authority. Almost every country has requirements concerning the regular inspection of building sites and these are invariably contained in the Regulations laid down by each country.

With the increase in prefabricated building materials offering the opportunity for export trade, knowledge of the regulations in force in the countries where a market is sought is obviously essential. This small book should help to provide some of the guidelines needed.

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